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The demise of monetary damages as a remedy for breach ofthe
corporate director duty of due care means that only a breach of the
duty of loyalty or good faith affords the possibility of holding
corporate directors personally liable for wrongdoing. The author
argues that the fiduciary duty of loyalty contains both a widely-
appreciated, but rather minimal, "non-betrayal" aspect and a less-
appreciated, but more affirmative, "devotion" dimension. The
affirmative. thrust of loyalty, grounded in widely-shared cultural
norms andfinding expression in myriad literary and religious stories,
offers a doctrinal avenue for addressing a potentially broader range
of director misconduct than is commonly thought.
In a post-Enron world of corporate governance scandal and
calls for reform, fiduciary duty law presents, as a policy matter, a
possible state law-based approach for attaining greater director
accountability. The wisdom of doing so will depend, in part, on
whether the risk ofgreater financial exposure will induce enhanced
discharge of director responsibilities, to the advantage of share-
holders, or dissuade capable prospective director candidates from
service, to the detriment ofshareholders. At a more theoretical level,
understanding the affirmative facet of both the social norm of loyalty
and the legal duty of loyalty raises deeper questions such as whether
the supposed conceptual distinction between "care" and "loyalty" is
as clear as widely believed and whether corporate law fiduciary
discourse should continue to be conducted in moral-sounding terms
at all. This, in turn, depends on whether we sensibly conceive of
'Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University. Financial
support was provided by the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University. The
author appreciates the helpful comments of William Allen and Edward Rock, and of other
participants at the University of Michigan Law School's Judging Business conference, and the
thoughtful conments of Justice Jack Jacobs, Richard Marks, David Millon, Leo O'Brien, Adam
Pritchard, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, and Bradley Wendel, and the research assistance of
Jennifer Zary.
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directors as being moral actors and regard corporate relationships
as raising moral issues, rather than just economic/financial issues
for which a new (or re-loaded) discourse might be more suitable.
The article closes by addressing howjudges-to whom both the
practical and the policy-theory issues have fallen-might explore the
fuller reaches of loyalty. The article coins the notion of"due loyalty"
to express the appropriate, context-sensitive demands of loyalty
understood as devotion.
"[L]oyalty is an essential ingredient in any civilized and
humane system of morals."'
"[Miany younger girls did not understand the word [loyal]; older
girls and adults asked 'loyal to what?"'
2
"Of all the virtues presumed to have been lost in America, loyalty
generally takes pride of place."3 "No other institution... provokes such
bittersweet reflections of loyalty lost as the business corporation."4
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem corporate law has inherited, but risks squandering, a rich,
moral vocabulary. The cardinal notions of "care" and "loyalty" carry--or
did carry--profound social, philosophical, and literary meaning outside
corporate law discourse. When used to describe director fiduciary duties
within contemporary corporate law discourse, however, those core terms
often impart remarkably little of that same richness. One result is the tragic
Enron story, which with the passage of time will be seen as a failure of
corporate governance, that is, a failure of care and loyalty.
Today, the duty of care serves as only a very weak substantive
constraint on director conduct and is spoken of in unusually shrunken
terms.5 With respect to the duty of loyalty-now receiving renewed
attention precisely because of care's dramatic decline--one likewise
wonders whether in the years ahead this baseline duty will bear any lexical
'JOHN LADD, Loyalty, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 97 (1967).
'Girl Scouts of the USA, National Council Meeting Workbook/Guide (New York: Girl
Scouts of the USA, 1972) 24, quoted in JAMEs DAvisoN HUNTER, THE DEATH OF CHARACTER
72 (2000). In 1972, the Girl Scouts deleted from their handbook the requirement that a scout be
"loyal."
3ALAN WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM 23 (2001). Professor Wolfe is a noted sociologist.
4Seeid at 26.
SSee Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CoRP. L.
787, 788-89 (1999).
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resemblance to its historical, moral counterpart. Perhaps, as with care, it
will be drained of any genuinely arduous demands. Or, following the Girl
Scouts' example in 1972, corporate law authorities may discard the notion
altogether after concluding they do "not understand the word."6 Perhaps
too, Enron is not a unique story of loyalty lost, but a symptom of a deeper,
more endemic corporate failing.
This article focuses on the state of, and possibilities for, loyalty
discourse in corporate law. Tragedy, whether in corporate life as seen in
Enron, or in our larger social life as seen on September 11, invites deep
reflection. The article is an argument that, after Enron, we should
remember the quality of loyalty and reclaim it as central to corporate well-
being. It does not do so by arguing that Enron is a story of failed loyalty-
though existing evidence points that way-because the complicated facts
of that debacle are still unfolding. Instead, the article proceeds by drawing
a portrait of loyalty as it has been, and is now, both in corporate law and in
our larger social milieu. With such a picture of loyalty in mind, we may
ask whether the malaise in corporate culture-including Enron but extend-
ing far beyond it-signifies a serious but still remediable regulatory failure
or a more basic and troubling moral failure. This deeper inquiry requires
a portrayal of what loyalty discourse looks like in corporate law today,
what it has looked like in the past, and what it could look like in the future.
The article begins by identifying why the duty of loyalty has
emerged as so critical at this moment in corporate law, both injudge-made
legal doctrine and potentially in scholarship. On the scholarship front, after
twenty-five years of largely being colonized by the law and economics
perspective, a new found interest in social norms is emerging This
exploration of norms in corporate governance requires a vocabulary. To
actually affect corporate doctrine and practice, this vocabulary should be
accessible to, and widely shared by, the key institutional actors-judges,
directors, and lawyers. Due to its fluid and open texture, along with its
historic roots in corporate law discourse, the norm of loyalty can link the
new doctrinal debate over the dividing line between care and loyalty with
the emergent scholarly inquiry into how norms in the larger social-moral
milieu shape, and are shaped, by corporate law.
6See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
7See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253,
1254-55 (1999); Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001);
see generally Robert Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL
STuDIEs 537, 538-39 (1998) (noting the impact of legal scholarship on social norms);
Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000) (commenting on a
number of social norms which regulate civic acts, and the economic internalization affecting these
civic acts).
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The article next explores whether the contours of loyalty in corporate
law are, or ever have been, either especially clear or as narrowly confined
as many imagine. Disparate philosophical meanings of loyalty are
sketched, ranging from a minimalist aspect of nonbetrayal to the more full-
bodied dimension of affirmative devotion. The inevitable way in which
loyalty as devotion intersects the crucial concept of care-thereby compli-
cating ongoing judicial efforts to differentiate these core notions-is
addressed next. That innate overlap invites the basic question of whether
a moral vocabulary, comprised of overtly normative words like "care" and
"loyalty," should still be used in contemporary corporate law discourse.
The continued value of moral language depends upon whether corporate
law conceives of directors as full-fledged moral actors (for whom moral
language makes sense) or as one-dimensional economic functionaries (for
whom moral language makes little sense). Closely linked to this issue is
corporate law's still-unresolved stance on a longstanding concern-the
nature of social bonds within the corporation. If such bonds are best
envisioned as predominantly bargained-for in nature, then corporate law's
inherited moral vocabulary is either best discarded in favor of more
instrumental terms, or as with care, refashioned so as to be morally
innocuous. Alternatively, if directors are understood as embedded in a
social-historical-moral milieu not entirely of their own making, then the use
of traditional moral terms to describe their duties is still warranted.
The final part of the article links loyalty discourse to the interpretive,
policy, and doctrinal facets of judging. It closes on a pragmatic note by
coining the notion of "due loyalty." This suggested doctrinal phrase is
designed to promote creative-but still disciplined and historically
faithful--discourse about where and how to draw the decidedly unsettled
boundaries of loyalty in modern corporate law. Knowing what loyalty is
and has been, we can decide, after Enron, what its place should be in future
corporate life.
H. WHY CLASSIFYING DIRECTOR MISCONDUCT MATTERS
The fiduciary duty of corporate directors includes a duty of care and
a duty of loyalty." The financial consequences of breaching these two
duties, however, are quite different. After several prominent directors in
1985 were held personally liable to shareholders for breach of care in the
high-profile case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,9 the Delaware legislature quickly
SSee, e.g., Smithv. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,872-73 (Del. 1985); E. Norman Veasey,
The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 Bus. LAw. 393, 397 (1997).
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
[Vol. 28
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adopted a statute permitting the charters of Delaware corporations to limit
or eliminate director liability for monetary damages arising from fiduciary
duty breaches.' ° This statutory limitation is subject to four specified
exceptions where personal liability remains." Since the four exceptions do
not include the duty of care, 2 corporate charters may exculpate directors
from monetary liability for breach of this baseline duty.'3 It now is quite
common for charters of Delaware corporations to provide such exoneration.
The upshot of this development is that aggrieved stockholders
seeking damages must now convince a court that director misconduct is not
solely classifiable as a breach of care, 4 but is behavior falling within one
or more of the four statutory exceptions permitting money damages.'" One
'See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 2000). Exculpation under the
statute belongs to individual directors, not the board as a whole, and thus must be determined on
a director by director basis. In re Student Loan Corp. Deriv. Litig., No. 17,799, 2002 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 7, at "13 n.8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2002).
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 2000). Equitable remedies are
unaffected by this statute and therefore a proven breach of the duty of care can result in the grant
of equitable relief. Other states quickly followed Delaware's lead. By 1986, over thirty states
already had adopted similar, or even stronger, laws. See Douglas M. Branson, Assault On
Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of LoyaltyApplicable to Corporate
Directors, 57 FoRDHAM L. REv. 375, 381 & n.30 (1988).
2In pertinent part, section 102(b)(7) provides as follows:
§ 102. Contents of Certificate of Incorporation
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation
may also contain any or all of the following matters:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty
to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith
or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii)
under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 2000)
"See, e.g., Rosser v. New Valley Corp., No. 17,272, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115, at *26
(Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2000).
'4Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (providing that section
102(b)(7) charter provision "bars the recovery of monetary damages from directors for a
successful stockholder claim that is based exclusively upon establishing a violation of the duty
of care").
"Numerous recent decisions in Delaware address the classification of director
wrongdoing issues for this reason. See, e.g., Grace Bros. Ltd. v. Uniholding Corp., No. 17,612,
2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101 (Del. Ch. July 12,2000), reprinted in 27 DEL.J. CORP. L. 304 (2002);
O'Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 915 (Del. Ch. 1999). The Delaware
Supreme Court has indicated that directors must raise § 102(bX7) as an affirmative defense and
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of the exceptions pertains to a breach of the duty of loyalty 6 and another
pertains to acts or omissions not in good faith. Plaintiff-stockholders,
therefore, understandably seek to broadly characterize director conduct as
violating the duty of loyalty or good faith, arguing for an expansive reading
of these notions. 7 On the other hand, defendant-directors argue that loyalty
is a tightly circumscribed concept and that stockholder grievances implicate
only the duty of care, thereby precluding damages.
Theoretically, at its most ambitious, the stockholder project would
aim to subsume many, if not most or all, of the obligations imposed by
"care" under the rubric of "loyalty." This is best achieved by a two-fold
strategy. First, shareholders might argue, the duty of care should be
accorded a narrow scope, thereby leaving all other fiduciary demands for
the residual domain of loyalty. Second, it might alternatively be suggested
that loyalty encompasses care, that one cannot truly be loyal without care,
and that the concept of care remains an integral part of corporate law
through the doctrine of loyalty.' This is an attractive and philosophically
compelling position. At the same time, however, it is a dangerous strategy
because it risks a rhetorical obliteration of any conceptually sharp boundary
line between care and loyalty-two notions often thought to occupy
separate spheres.
Opposing views on director liability require ajudicial determination
as to whether a complaint's allegations essentially raise care or loyalty
bear the burden of establishing each of its elements. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910,926 (Del.
2000) (citing Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999)). For a collection and
discussion of Delaware decisions dealing with director liability in the year 2002, see William D.
Johnston & Dawn M. Jones, DirectorLiability and lndemnification in American BarAssociation,
REV. DEv. IN Bus. & CORP. LITIG. 2002 (2002). No decisions in 2002 granted pretrial dismissal
of all claims based on a section 102(b)(7) charter provision.
6See supra note 12.
"Although this article addresses loyalty, another exception to director exculpation is
absence of good faith. Concern about director misconduct of a sort thought to be appropriate for
the sanction of damages might be characterized as a "loyalty" breach or a "good faith" breach.
Recently, Chief Justice Veasey has suggested that lack of good faith might be a fitting
characterization of certain director conduct.
[I]f directors claim to be independent by saying, for example, that they base
decisions on some performance measure and don't do so, or if they are
disingenuous or dishonest about it, it seems to me that courts in some
circumstances could treat their behavior as a breach of the fiduciary duty of good
faith.
E Norman Veasey, What's Wrong with Executive Compensation?, HARV. BUS. REV. 11, 76 (Jan.
2003). See also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the
Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAW. 1371, 1385-86, 1393-95
(2002) (discussing good faith).
"This is an ironic example of a social norn-care--finding expression through a legal
doctrine--loyalty-with which it is often contrasted.
[Vol. 28
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charges.'9 In addressing this question, lawyers and judges, for the first time
in corporate law, must give sustained attention to identifying the key
qualities of loyalty, e.g., as well as stating with precision whether and how
that duty differs from, or overlaps with, the duty of care.2" This taxonomic
endeavor is quite new, and represents a surprisingly complex and signifi-
cant chapter in corporate law. As usual in corporate law,2 this chapter is
quietly being written by corporate lawyers and the judges of the Delaware
Chancery22 and Supreme Courts. Unfortunately, however, this newly-
emerging issue in corporate law is being addressed with relatively little
scholarly input, and with no visible effort to enrich the dialogue by drawing
upon what loyalty means in the wider social-philosophical and literary
realms of discourse. Grounding contemporary corporate law's under-
standing of loyalty both in larger, social-normative treatments of that
concept, and in corporate law's own historic renderings of that notion, can
enhance an appreciation of loyalty's full potential. This is now critical for
corporate law for three reasons. First, judges must give the word "loyalty"
in the text of section 102(b)(7) and similar state statutes an authoritative
interpretation. Second, the waning of care places enormous significance on
whether loyalty is a norm/duty sufficiently robust and fluid that it can fulfill
the ongoing demands that corporate law still entrusts to fiduciary duty.
Finally, the aftermath of Enron, with charges of betrayal and disloyalty,
invites the rethinking of loyalty both as a corporate law duty and as a
widely shared social norm.
A. Is The Meaning of Loyalty Clear?
The word "loyalty," like many words commonly used-such as
"good," "fair," "tender"-seems clear in meaning until we are pressed to
define it or say whether in a particular instance it was or was not present.
9See, e.g., In re Lukens Inc. Sholders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 728 (Del. Ch. 1999), affd
sub noma. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (2000) (order) (stating that "[t]he presence of
the section 102(b)(7) provision in the Lukens charter thus causes me to inquire, at the threshold,
into the nature of the breaches of the fiduciary duty alleged in the Complaint").
As suggested earlier, supra note 17, some might prefer to augment the notion of "good
faith" rather than loyalty, to stand in contrast to the duty of care.
2 See Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and
Corporate Law, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 865 (1990); Edward B. Rock, Saints andSinners: How Does
Delaware Corporate Law Work? 44 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1009 (1997).
'See, e.g., Grace Bros. Ltd. v. Uniholding Corp., No. 17,612,2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101
(Del. Ch. July 12, 2000), reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 304 (2002); Goodwin v. Live Entm't,
Inc., No. 15,765, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 1999), reprinted in 24 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1084 (1999), affd 741 A.2d 16 (Del. 1999). See also supra note 15 (citing to collection
of recent authority).
2003]
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Language in many Delaware cases suggests that the scope of the duty of
loyalty is both tightly circumscribed and clearly demarcated from that of
the duty of care. For example, "[a]n allegation that properly motivated
directors, [acted] for no improper personal reason ... does not state a
claim for breach of the duty of loyalty."23 "[T]he essence of a duty of
loyalty claim is the assertion that a corporate officer or director has misused
power over corporate property or processes in order to benefit himself
rather than advance corporate purposes."" Without an "attempt to show
that the directors received any personal benefit as a result of [their conduct]
... the alleged disclosure violations simply cannot implicate the duty of
loyalty."25 Accordingly, because care and loyalty are "distinct duties...
without some factual basis to suspect [director] motivations, any
subsequent finding of liability will, necessarily, depend on finding breaches
of the duty of care, not loyalty or good faith."26
Much knowledgeable commentary supports the suggestion that the
ambit of loyalty is both clear-cut and distinct from that of the duty of care.
For example, the duty of loyalty recently was described as requiring
directors to "refrain from self-dealing, bad faith actions, fraud and usurping
corporate opportunities." '27 Similarly, "the duty of loyalty imposes an
obligation on the corporate manager to avoid conflict of interest trans-
actions. 28  This apparently well-marked province for loyalty leads
experienced commentators to conclude that "the concepts of loyalty and
due care seem analytically distinct."29 Other experts likewise sum up the
purportedly clear boundary between the coverage of the two duties as
follows: "When there is no adverse financial or personal interest, a
'In re GM Class H Sholders Litig., 734 A.2d611,618 (Del. Ch. 1999) (emphasis added)
(citing Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1147-48 (Del. 1990)).
"4Steinerv. Meyerson, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.L. Rep. 98,857, at 93,146
(Del. Ch. July 19, 1995), reprinted in 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 320 (1996) (emphasis added).
'Frank v. Arnelle, No. 15,642, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 176, at *39 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16,
1998) (emphasis added) (citing Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob: The
Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1087, 1156 (1996)).
26Lukens, 757 A.2d at 731-32 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
"Brian J. McCarthy & Wallace M. Wong, Advising the Board: Issues for Boards of
Directors, 1183 PLIICoRP. 659, 664 (2000) (emphasis added).
sDavid S. Ruder, Duty of Loyalty--A Law Professor's Status Report, 40 Bus. LAW.
1383, 1386 (1985) (emphasis added).
'R. FRANKLIN BALOTn & JESSE A. FNKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.35, at 4-246 n.1221 (3d ed., 2002 Supp.).
[Vol. 28
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question as to whether the directors have exercised good faith and requisite
care implicates only the duty of care, not the duty of loyalty.
30
On the other hand, commentary and case law also supports the
opposite proposition, that the demands of the duty of loyalty are neither
well-defined nor sharply differentiated from those of care. Judge Frank
Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel concluded: "Ultimately, though,
there is no sharp line between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty."'"
Professors Lawrence Cunningham and Charles Yablon, after reviewing
several Delaware decisions from the late 1980s and early 1990s, detect a
judicial tendency to "blur the distinction between duty of care and duty of
loyalty."32 Evidence ofjudicial uncertainty is perhaps best captured in the
conflicting assertions made by experienced lawyers within the same
footnote of their highly-regarded treatise: "[T]he cases have blurred the
distinction .... [C]ourts... [are] continuing to recognize the traditional
distinctions between loyalty and due care issues.""
Abundant case law in Delaware-the most prominent corporate law
jurisdiction-likewise shows that the contours of the duty of loyalty and
the line of demarcation between that duty and the duty of care are far
fuzzier than often suggested. This is made evident in frequent assertions
that the mere absence of a conflicting interest by a director is insufficient
either to fulfill the duty of loyalty or to differentiate loyalty from care.34
For example, the Delaware Supreme Court concedes that director duties in
a contest for corporate control setting "do not admit of easy categorization
as duties of care or loyalty."35 The difficulty of characterization partly
stems from the fact that, notwithstanding case law and commentator
30RODMAN WARD, JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW § 141.2, at
GCL-IV-20 (4th ed., 2000 -2 Supp.) (emphasis added) (citing Solash v. Telex Corp. [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RPTR. (CCH) 93, 608, at 97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988)).
3
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATELAW 103(1991). See Branson, supra note 11, at 383-84. ProfessorAlison Anderson
noted in 1978 that both the careless and the disloyal director are, in one sense, choosing self-
interest over duty to others, the former choosing the "easy life" and the latter choosing "tangible
benefits." Alison Anderson, Conflicts ofinterest: Efficiency, Fairness And Corporate Structure,
25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738, 758 n.59 (1978). Although the duties are similar in the sense noted, a
thesis of this article is that loyalty and care each have a more affirmative thrust that does not
involve self-gain.
2Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After
QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End ofRevlon Duties?), 49 Bus. LAW. 1594,
1625 (1994).
33
BALoTrI & FINKELSTEiN, supra note 29, at 4-246 to 4-247 n. 1221.
341n re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. S'holders Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 67 (Del. 1995). See also
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) (citing Guth v.
Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
3S5ee In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S'holders Litig., 669 A.2d at 67.
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pronouncements to the contrary,36 fulfilling the duty of corporate loyalty
demands more than the absence of director self-interest." Rather,
"evidence of disloyalty... include[s], but certainly [is] not limited to, the
motives of entrenchment, fraud upon the corporation or the board,
abdication of directorial duty, or the sale of one's vote."38 This inclusive,
illustrative phrasing suggests that the duty of loyalty is open-textured rather
than tightly-bounded and that merely avoiding instances of personal interest
will not discharge the duty. The Delaware Court of Chancery reinforces
this point with its observation that a breach of loyalty can be unintended,
and can occur even when board action is taken in good faith.39 Chancellor
Chandler, after noting that his view might be "wrapped in lofty idealism,"4
recently generalized that the "fiduciary duty of loyalty . . . is always
implicated where the board seeks to thwart the action of the company's
shareholders.""' Vice Chancellor Strine has likewise observed that self-
interest is not always present in a loyalty breach, stating: "[A] fiduciary
may act disloyally for a variety of reasons other than personal pecuniary
interest; and . . . regardless of his motive, a director who consciously
disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders may suffer a
personal judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes. ,
42
Decisions in the oversight and disclosure contexts also show that the
sphere of loyalty is not easily cordoned off from the duty of care on the
faulty ground that self-interest is always necessary to trigger loyalty. This
can readily be seen in the director oversight and disclosure contexts. The
Delaware Supreme Court has characterized the conduct of disinterested
directors who abandon their oversight responsibilities as a breach of the
duties of care and loyalty.43 Recently, a federal appeals court applying
Delaware law held that allegations of a reckless breach of the duty of care
in exercising oversight would be construed as a breach of good faith, and
36See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
38Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993) (citations omitted).
39Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988); accord State of
Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 17,637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *27 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 4, 2002, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 726, 739 (2002), reargument denied, No.
17,637, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2001).
4°State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *44.
411d.
42Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
"3See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993) (citing Lutz v.
Boas, 171 A.2d 381 (Del. Ch. 1961) (referencing a director abdication case, as an example of
disloyalty)). See also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.32 (Del.
1988) (observing that a board's abandonment of oversight functions breaches duties of loyalty and
care).
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not within the statutory exculpation." Another federal appeals court
interpreted a complaint alleging intentional breach of director oversight
duties as a breach of good faith falling outside the exculpation provision.45
In the disclosure context, the court repeatedly has stated that the "duty of
directors to observe proper disclosure requirements derives from the
combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good faith."
4
Bottoming director oversight and disclosure responsibilities on loyalty,47
as well as care,48 can only mean there is more to the duty of loyalty than an
obligation to "refrain from '49 or "avoid""0 self-interest.
Possibly, these varied statements bring to light that courts and
commentators do not really know what "loyalty" means, or perhaps they
simply reveal disagreement as to what that particular duty demands. Either
possibility would account for the frequent, seemingly inconsistent
descriptions of loyalty's requirements. Alternatively, "loyalty" might be a
more complex notion than commonly thought and therefore may have
different meanings. In that event, courts and commentators may vacillate
in their use of the concept, not really explaining the various meanings they
are invoking or even being fully aware of them. If this is the case, what
appear to be incompatible statements about loyalty are simply incomplete
statements. Courts and commentators tend to focus on a singular aspect of
loyalty raised in the particular context at hand and then speak categorically
about it. The practice of generalizing from the particular may result in
rhetorical carelessness about loyalty. The fact remains, however, that a
variety of director conduct is judicially recognized as raising loyalty
concerns. This indicates an appreciation that the concept of loyalty may be
comprised of different dimensions. What are the possible meanings of
"loyalty?"
B. The Disparate Meanings of Loyalty
In his insightful essay on loyalty, Professor George Fletcher
differentiates between what he calls the "minimal condition" and the
"McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 1000-01 (6th Cir. 2001).
"In re Abbott Labs. Deriv. Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2003).
"Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998) (citing Cinerama Inc. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995)). The author does not necessarily agree with the
suggestion in these cases that there are three fiduciary duties, rather than two (loyalty and care),
but instead cites the cases for recognizing that care and loyalty can work in tandem.
47See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999).
'See, e.g., Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050 (Del. 1996).
"'See supra text accompanying note 26.
5See supra text accompanying note 27.
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"maximum condition" for loyalty. 1 The "minimum condition" requires the
loyal actor to "reject temptation"52 and consists of"not betraying the object
of one's loyalty."53 Examples of minimal loyalty include "not committing
adultery, not fighting for the enemy, [and] not worshiping foreign gods."54
This view of loyalty, as demanding "the minimum commitment of
nonbetrayal,"" parallels philosopher John Ladd's view that "at the very
least, loyalty requires the complete subordination of one's own private
interest."56 Moreover, it comports with sociologist James Hunter's recent
argument that the "most basic element of character is moral discipline,""
the "most essential feature [of which] is the inner capacity for restraint-an
ability to inhibit oneself in one's passions, desires, and habits within the
boundaries of a moral order. 8
By way of contrast, Fletcher describes the "maximum condition" of
loyalty as involving "an element of devotion"'59 and "affirmative duties of
devotion"' as well. In this more positive aspect of loyalty, he adopts the
view of Josiah Royce that loyalty is "[tIhe willing and practical and
thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause."6' In this most robust
account of loyalty, it is not simply a restraint or inhibition on self-interest.62
Instead, it runs in favor of another, such as a "spouse, nation, and ajealous
God."'63 Moreover, this dimension of loyalty is never general or abstract,
but rather is "always specific; a man is loyal to his lord, his father, or his
comrades.""





"1FLETCHER, supra note 51, at 24.
6LADD, supra note 1, at 98 (emphasis added).
"JAMES DAViSON HUNTER, THE DEATH OF CHARACTER 16 (2000).
:"Id. (emphasis added).
59FLETCHER, supra note 51, at 9, 24.
6°Id. at 24.
61JosiAH ROYCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY 16-17 (1924).
62FLETCHER, supra note 51, at 40.
6 Id.
"LADD, supra note 1, at 97. WOLFE, supra note 3, at 26 (providing that "[Iloyalty, after
all, is not an abstract virtue .... The absence of loyalty is not some theoretical state of affairs
that may cause problems in the future, but an everyday affront").
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This more affirmative cast of loyalty dovetails with what James
Hunter describes as a second element of character, "moral attachment,"65
a necessary ingredient if character "is defined not just negatively but
positively as well. '"" This facet of character "reflects the affirmation of our
commitments to a larger community." '67 Hunter, like Fletcher, underscores
the affirmative dimension of "attachment."6R At the same time, like Ladd,
he stresses the particularity of"attachment," stressing that its exercise is not
abstract or general, but rather is always historically, socially, and culturally
situated.69
This enriched framework for understanding the twofold nature of
loyalty, drawn from moral philosophy, helps elucidate the seemingly
inconsistent judicial and commentator assertions about the duty of loyalty
found in corporate law discourse. Those courts and commentators
emphasizing the necessity of personal gain or benefit as the hallmark of a
loyalty breach,70 or the corresponding need to "refrain from"
71 or "avoid "72
self-interest tofufill the duty, are describing the "minimal condition for
loyalty."' Courts and scholars using loyalty in this tightly-bounded sense
ofnonbetrayal can quite readily differentiate this type of loyalty claim from
a duty of care claim. A recent example is Professor Melvin Eisenberg's
statement that "[t]he duty of loyalty concems the standards that apply to the
conduct of corporate actors who are not free ofself-interest."74 Put another
way, "[t]he duty of loyalty is a shorthand expression for the duty of fair
dealing by . . . [directors] when they are financially interested in a
matter."" This formulation accurately expresses the minimal demand of
loyalty. It is wrong, however, if it is meant to suggest that loyalty is not
always demanded, but is required only of those under a specific
6
HUNTER, supra note 57, at 16. Albert Hirschman also describes loyalty as "attachment"
to an organization, and notes that it may precede or follow actual influence within an organization.
See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY-RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FiRMs,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 77 (1970).




7"See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
7 See supra text accompanying note 27.
'See supra text accompanying note 28.
nFLETCHER, supra note 51, at 9.
7'4Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1265 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 1271 (emphasis added).
2003]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
temptation.76 More importantly, it neglects the way in which a person,
without personal gain, can fail to be loyal by not affirmatively being
devoted to the well-being of another.
Conversely, cases and commentary unwilling to narrowly confine
loyalty, or to regard it as always sharply distinguished from care, may do
so out of an (unspoken) appreciation of loyalty's more affirmative, maximal
thrust of"devotion"07 or "attachment.01 In fact, the twofold "minimal" and
"maximum" dimensions of loyalty, and their corresponding demands of
nonbetrayal and devotion, permeate corporate law rhetoric. Some examples
from corporate law discourse will help in seeing this.
The seminal case of Guth v. Loft, Inc. 79 succinctly captures the dual
mandate of loyalty. The Delaware Supreme Court, addressing loyalty in
the usurpation of the corporate opportunity context, described the double
thrust of director duty as "not only affirmatively to protect the interests of
the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit
or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it.""
Highlighting the minimal facet of loyalty in that case, where a director had
seized a corporate opportunity for personal advantage, the court placed the
linguistic emphasis on the nonbetrayal aspect." The Delaware Supreme
Court did so only after first recognizing the duty to affirmatively protect
corporate interests, the aspect less pointedly at issue.' Occasionally, the
emphasis will run the other way, as where the Delaware Supreme Court
reversed the phrasing in Guth to underscore a director's duty of"maximum"
loyalty.83 That court reasoned: "Not only do these principles demand that
corporate fiduciaries absolutely refrain from any act which breaches the
trust reposed in them, but also to affirmatively protect and defend those
7"he Delaware Supreme Court has described director duty as not operating
"intermittently, but is the constant compass by which all director actions for the corporation...
must be guided." Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
"See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
'See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
795 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). See WARD ET AL., supra note 30, § 141.2.1.1, at GCL-IV-18.
80Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (emphasis added). For a very similar, double-edged description of
director duty, see Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 606 (1875).
R'See Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
8Id.
'See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1289 (Del. 1988).
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interests entrusted to them."" That court stressed that subduing self-
serving impulses is not, by itself, the same as acting loyally. 5
Once alert to the twofold dimension of loyalty, one begins to discern
its acknowledgment with some frequency in corporate law. For example,
the Model Business Corporation Act bends over backward to facilitate and
uphold director conflict of interest transactions.8 6 Nevertheless, in a note
on Fair Transactions-where the legal standard of "fairness" for such
conflict transactions is elaborated - the reviewing court is admonished
that to sustain the transaction it must find "favorable results ... from the
perspective offirthering the corporation's business activities."87 In other
words, where self-interest is or could be present, merely examining the
substantive and procedural fairness of a self-interested transaction is
insufficient. To fulfill the director's duty of loyalty, the corporation's
interest must be more than unharmed or unbetrayed; it must affirmatively
be furthered.
The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance
reaches the same result, stating that to sustain a director conflict of interest
transaction, a determination must be made that the "transaction affirma-
tively will be in the corporation's best interest."88 The Corporate Director's
Guide Book similarly highlights the affirmative character of loyalty
whereby "[t]he duty of loyalty requires directors to exercise their powers
in the interests of the corporation and not in the directors' own interest or
in the interest of another person (including a family member) or
organization.8.9 The Guide Book's formulation denies the legal sufficiency
of the "minimal condition" of loyalty in two ways. First, it emphasizes the
need to affirmatively advance the corporation's interests. Second, it points
out that promoting a third-party's interests ahead of the corporation's is as
disloyal as a director furthering her own interests, a point too frequently
forgotten in corporate law."
"Id. at 1289 (emphasis added); accord McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 919 (Del.
2000) (reasoning that directors have an "affirmative duty to protect the interests of the minority,
as well as the majority, stockholders").
"5See Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1280.
"MODEL Bus. CORP. ANN. § 8.61 (3d ed. 1998/99 Supp.)
"Id. (emphasis added). See, e.g., Fill Bldgs. Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co.,
241 N.W.2d 466, 469 & n.7 (Mich. 1976).
"AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 219 (1992) (emphasis added).
"CoMMrrTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S
GUIDEBOOK (1994), reprinted in 49 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1254-55 (1994).
"See RESTATEMENT TRUSTS (SECOND) § 170, comment q (stating that it is improper for
a trustee to act to benefit a third party rather than the trust estate). For recent examples of cases
recognizing that directors can be disloyal by preferring interests other than their own over the
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These instances, like those cited earlier,91 reveal the true scope of
loyalty in corporate law discourse. Recurrent corporate law rhetoric,
reflecting the "devotion" facet of loyalty, refutes the position that a director
fulfills the duty of loyalty merely by refraining from disloyal (betrayal)
behavior. As Professor Gregory Alexander recently stated: "[F]iduciary
law's loyalty obligation requires that one party completely subordinate self-
interest and act exclusively for the benefit of the other party."9 2
Upon seeing that loyalty both in and out of corporate law means
more than the absence of disloyalty (betrayal), the question arises as to how
an enriched understanding of loyalty's two meanings might help judges
differentiate loyalty from care for the purpose of interpreting section
102(b)(7) and similar corporate statutes in other states. Put another way,
how is the affirmative "devotion" or "attachment" dimension of loyalty
related to the norm (and duty) of "care?" Philosophically, the issue is
whether identifying the two facets of loyalty serves to create clarity
between care and loyalty, or whether it reveals that there is some
intersecting of the two moral/legal virtues. This obviously depends not
only on what "loyalty" means, but also on what "care" means. Perhaps it
too has more than one dimension, either as a social norm, as a legal duty or
both. Possibly, the positive reach of loyalty partially overlaps care, or
perhaps loyalty is one component of the even richer-dimensioned and more
fundamental concept of"care." Stated differently, the more full-bodied the
concept of loyalty is, the more likely that the philosophical boundary
between loyalty and care is "fuzzy" rather than sharp. Corporate law's
binary liability scheme, however, as manifested in section 102(b)(7) and
similar statutes in other states, contemplates no such ill-defined dividing
line between the two duties. Supposedly, Delaware law is clear in that
directors face no personal liability for breach of "care" claims, only for
breach of "loyalty" claims." This tidy appraisal assumes a discreteness of
meaning more hoped for than real. It hinges entirely on regarding care as
one-dimensional and on distinguishing care from only one facet of
loyalty-the "minimum" condition of nonbetrayal.
corporation's well-being, see infra text accompanying notes 161-82.
9 1See supra text accompanying notes 34-50.
'Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory ofFiduciary Relationships, 85 CoRNELL L.
REV. 767, 776 (2000) (emphasis added).
"See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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C. The Meeting of Loyalty and Care
William Bennett explicitly links loyalty and care when he states that
"[t]o be... loyal.., means to operate within a certain framework of caring
seriously about the well-being of [another]."' Caring about someone in
this view is a necessary element of loyalty. It does not logically follow that
the converse is true; that is, that loyalty necessarily and always is an
element of care. Nor does it follow from such linkage that care and loyalty
mean the same thing. Finally, notwithstanding Bennett's use of the word
"means," the statement is not definitional in the same way Fletcher's notion
of "maximum" loyalty helps define loyalty. Rather, the statement
essentially is a claim that humans are loyal only because, whatever the
individual's normative framework, they first care seriously about the well-
being of another. In short, "care" underlies "loyalty" so that without care
there is no loyalty.
The view that care undergirds loyalty is not, from a philosophical
standpoint, a startling conclusion. Care, in life and thought, is a rich and
foundational concept, sufficiently so that Martin Heidegger viewed care as
such "a primordial structural totality" that "[b]eing must be defined as
'care."'95 Religious stories confirm the central place of care. This is seen
in the story of the Good Samaritan, who himself "took care" of a beaten
man and later instructed an innkeeper to "take care of him,"' and in Christ's
famous charge to His apostle Peter to "[t]ake care of my sheep." '
Moreover, care is a multidimensional rather than a simple, unidimensional
idea. For example, section 141 (a) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law places the business and affairs of a corporation under the "direction of
a board of directors."" "Direction" is defined as the guidance and
supervision of another's welfare or care." This is similar to the phrase
"under a doctor's care." A doctor must "take care of" his or her patient just
as the board of directors is charged to "take care of' the corporation's
business and affairs. Physician or directorial neglect or abdication of duties
94WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE BOOK OF VIRTUES 665 (1993). Albert Hirschman also
connects loyalty and care, describing a "loyalist" as one "who cares" about an organization.
ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY-RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMs,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 83 (1970). See id at 99-100, 104.
9"MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 238 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson
trans., Harper & Row 1962) (1927).
96Luke 10:34-35, THE HOLY BIBLE (New American Standard Bible).
97John 21:16-17, THE HOLY BIBLE (New International Version Bible).
98DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a) (1991 & Supp. 2000).
99See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting
director "supervisory" role under § 141(a)).
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is a violation of care and a failure to "take care of' in this most fundamental
sense.
Besides using the term "care" to mean taking "care of' someone, we
also use "care" to mean that someone "cares for" the well-being or interests
of another. When someone "cares for" another, the affirmative object of
attention and energy is the well-being of the other, not the actor's interests
or those of a third party.'t" Neglect violates this obligation of care because
it is a failure to "care for" the other's welfare. Promoting personal self-
interest (betrayal) rather than the other's advancement also is a failure to
"care for" the proper interests. -' Accordingly, the notion of care as
affirmative concern and solicitudefor the interests of another, care is the
foundation of, and the key linkage to, the notion of loyalty. A moral actor,
such as a director, cannot be said to be loyal if he or she fails to discharge
the obligation to "care for" the corporation, either by serving his or her own
or another's interests to the detriment of the corporation (betrayal) or by
failing to affirmatively advance the corporation's interests.'0 ' This
particular meaning of care, to affirmatively and unremittingly0 2 "care for"
the interests of another, means loyalty in Professor Fletcher's and Josiah
Royce's sense of "devotion" and in James Hunter's sense of "attachment."
Moreover, an underlying stance of "care for" the welfare of another
supplies an explanation for why loyal conduct occurs-loyalty is a
behavioral extension of a deeper disposition.0 3
"®Recently, the author received a mailing from his alma mater, Carleton College, the
cover of which read "care for Carleton." Inside was a story about a fishman student who directly
benefits from alumni giving and a request to "care for" the work of the college by making a
donation. In the author's view, such a request, while of course institutionally self-serving,
nonetheless attractively appeals to the alumni's personal, humane concern for advancing the good
work of the school.
'0'Cumberland Coal & Iron. Co., 42 Md. 598 (1875), captures this point. Observing that
a "corporation is entitled to the supervision of all the directors," the court noted that if a director
deals with his own company "the corporation is deprived of the benefit of his judgment and
supervision in regard to matters in which such judgment and supervision might be most essential
to its interest and protection." Id. at 606. In other words, even assuming the director self-dealing
is done in a procedurally proper manner, mere avoidance of disloyal conduct does not mean a
director has discharged his (loyalty) duty to promote corporate interests. This may account for
the requirement, in self-dealing settings, that the transaction affirmatively further the corporation's
interests. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. For brief treatment of the loyalty/care
connection in the professional responsibility setting, see Dennis J. Tuchler, Unavoidable Conflicts
of Interest and the Duty of Loyalty, 44 ST. L. UNIv. L.J. 1025, 1030-32 (2000).
'02The Delaware Supreme Court has described director duties as "unremitting" and
"constant." Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
t"'A recent expression of this appears in Vice Chancellor Jacobs' opinion in Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, No. Civ. A. 9700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *89 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2001),
rev'd 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001), where, in finding that non-interested directors had acted loyally,
he stated that the directors in that case had acted out of a "conscious concernfor ... the minority
AFTER ENRON: REMEMBERING LOYALTY DISCOURSE
Professor Maureen Cavanaugh's recent work on Aristotle's
understanding of homonyms elucidates a useful framework for
understanding this interconnection between care and loyalty.'O° Care is an
example of a "multivocal" word, 5 a word with more than a single
meaning. Consider the following three sentences:
(1) A board of directors is to "take care of' the corporation's
business and affairs;
(2) A board of directors is to "care for" the corporation and its
stockholders; and
(3) A board of directors is to act "with care."
The three phrases using the word "care" do not mean the same thing in all
three sentences. Therefore, the phrases employing the same word "care"
are not synonymous. For example, one can "care for" (as being concerned
about) the interests of another without necessarily acting "with care."
Likewise, one can act "with care" without acting out of "care for" the
interests of another. For example, the actor might "competently" advance
the wrong interests. Although not synonymous, the word groups revolve
around a "core,""' meaning that all three phrases using the word "care" do
"coalesce around a core notion,"'0 7 even though a different signification is
voiced in each phrase. Specifically, the phrase "care for" denotes what we
mean by the term "loyalty." The phrasing "care for" is a "derived"'08 or
"associated"'0 9 instance of the core notion of "care." Simply by virtue of
sharing at its center the word "care," however, does not make the phrase
"care for" synonymous with "take care of," i.e., indicating supervisory
responsibility, or with the phrase that directors are to act "with care," i.e.,
indicating a manner of acting.
For corporate law, the implications of the philosophical and
linguistic linkage between care and loyalty are profound. Recall that
modem corporate law now seeks to classify director wrongdoing into either
the duty of "care" or the duty of "loyalty" category because only a breach
of the latter supports money damages." 0 Yet, if the concept of loyalty is
stockholders' welfare." Id. (emphasis added). See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that director actions should be "motivated by a good faith
concern for the welfare of the corporation and its stockholders") (emphasis added).
"°Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle on Text, Context, and the
Rule of Law, 79 N.C. L. REV. 577 (2001).
'051d. at 624 & n.174.
'061d, at 638.
1071d. at 638 & n.220.
"'Cavanaugh, supra note 104, at 643-44.
09Id. at 645-46.
"OSupra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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deeply rooted in and intertwined with care in the ways developed above,
there is no easy division between all loyalty and all care claims. Therefore,
it is an oversimplification to say there is no personal liability for director
"care" breaches."' To the extent the affirmative dimension of loyalty
means to "care for," failing to care for the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders signifies a breach of loyalty supporting an award of
damages." 2 A sense of the deep connection articulated here may actually
lie implicit in those cases grounding certain director obligations in both
care and loyalty, e.g., oversight and disclosure." 3
Indeed, if the modem director duty of care is essentially the modest
duty to act "with care," in the phrasing above,"" by default that leaves the
duty of loyalty as a potentially fertile, and largely unmined, residual notion
capacious enough to encompass all other affirmative obligations thought to
be owed by a director charged to "take care of" and "care for" the
corporation. Such a rendering of loyalty is a considerably more demanding
directorial duty than mere nonbetrayal."'" Moreover, such a reading finds
"'See, e.g., Rosser v. New Valley Corp., No. 17,272,2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 115, at *26
(Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2000); Oliverv. Boston Univ., No. 16,570,2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 104, at *20
(Del. Ch. July 18, 2000) (revised July 25, 2000). Section 102(b)(7) does not expressly state that
corporations can absolve directors of liability for "care" breaches, understanding "care" as both
a multi-dimensional norm and a legal duty. Rather, it generally absolves for "breach of fiduciary
duty," subject to four exceptions, one of which is the duty of loyalty. See supra note 12. Thus,
any aspect of fiduciary duty characterized as "loyalty" in nature, even if at some root level it
implicates one or more facets of the ideal or norm of "care," would support a damage award
because the statute did not pointedly nullify damages for "care" claims. Thus, only those breaches
of the narrower legal duty of care--i.e., the process-oriented duty to act "with care"-that do not
implicate loyalty are immune from a damage award.
"2Chancellor Allen addressed director monitoring responsibility in the context of a duty
of care claim charging that defendants had failed to exercise adequate monitoring. In his
discussion, however, he also takes up director liability for outright neglect of, or inattention to,
monitoring. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). He
states that "only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight... will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability." Id. A "sustained or
systematic failure" of oversight is a failure to "take care of' or properly "care for" the interests of
the corporation and its stockholders. In this respect, it is a breach of the affirmative dimension
of loyalty. See supra text accompanying note 42. Although not describing it in that way,
Chancellor Allen does describe such conduct as possibly showing a lack of good faith--one of
the exceptions to exculpation in § 102(bX7). Therefore, it could be the sort of conduct supporting
damages. Moreover, many Delaware decisions regard bad faith as an instance of disloyalty, see
infra notes 157 and 245, thus bolstering the view that a "sustained or systematic" failure of
oversight might be a loyalty breach supporting damages as well as a breach of one dimension of
the care norm.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 34-50.
""See Johnson, supra note 5, at 810, 824-32.
'.Again, as noted earlier, supra note 17, some might prefer "good faith" as a doctrinal
vehicle for attaining what this article seeks to attain through "loyalty."
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ample support in corporate law's own bi-vocal mode of discourse.' 16 It is,
ironically, the very thinness of the term "care" in modem corporate law that
leaves the richer, more demanding dimensions of that core norm fully
available for importing into corporate law via the doctrine of loyalty.
Im. THE PERILS AND VALUE OF MORAL LANGUAGE IN CORPORATE LAW
Appreciating the breadth of "loyalty" and "care," and the central
place of those concepts in our social-moral lives, is one thing. Believing,
however, that such a moral vocabulary is necessarily appropriate or useful
forjudges and lawyers working in corporate law is more controversial. For
example, one might believe that judges deciding the outcomes of cases and
lawyers advising boards of directors are either unwilling or unable to
approach the duty of loyalty in the way suggested. These and other
practical concerns with the analysis are valid, and will be addressed in the
final section of the article. This section, however, provides a more
theoretical critique and defense of moral language in corporate law
discourse.
Leading critics of moral rhetoric in the corporate law narrative
include Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel, who assert
that "[f]iduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing;
they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way,
as other contractual undertakings."" 7 Easterbrook and Fischel believe
moral language in corporate law is, as Gregory Alexander characterizes it,
"overblown rhetoric that obscures more than it illuminates.""' Easterbrook
and Fischel would either expunge such moral rhetoric altogether or strip it
of any vital meaning.""
Professor Alexander's recent response to Easterbrook and Fischel
rightly emphasizes the connection between how judges rhetorically frame
fiduciary issues and how they reach outcomes when he stated: "Rhetoric
matters, too, precisely because it affects behavior." 20  One key
underpinning of moral language in fiduciary cases is judicial sensitivity to
""See supra text accompanying notes 80-92.
"'Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425, 427 (1993). Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller agree with this view.
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1068 (1990) ("[C]ourts should treat an
allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty as they would treat any alleged breach of contract.").
"gAlexander, supra note 92, at 767.
"'Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117, at 427.
120Alexander, supra note 92, at 777.
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the imbalance of power between fiduciary and beneficiary.'' This
imbalance largely stems from the beneficiary's passivity and the fiduciary's
control. Shareholder passivity results from, among other factors, structural
efficiency considerations, including the difficulty and costliness of
detecting and sanctioning abuses of power, and a learned reliance on the
effective safeguarding of fiduciary constraints. The result is a contextual
vulnerability quite different than that of arm's length bargain relation-
ships.' Fiduciary strictures induce resource providers to assume socially
desirable, but vulnerable, positions only by a proven track record of having
dependably watched over the interests of those who make themselves
susceptible.
Agreeing that courts use the overtly normative language of "loyalty"
and "care" to describe director duties, and that there are good policy
reasons for doing so, this article has examined a different question.
Namely, whether in a post- Enron world the moral vocabulary inherited by
corporate law will be fully used, or instead will be given a narrow and
uncommon reading. This article explores the prospects for that two-word
vocabulary through the sight-sharpening lenses of cultural-religious stories
and language analysis. The aim is to highlight the surprising range and
suppleness of corporate law's core notions of loyalty and care. As with fine
china used for everyday dinnerware, however, the very paucity of corporate
law terms may mean that exquisite but overworked words like "care" and
"loyalty" risk being reduced to hackneyed, professional cant. Pulled out of
the linguistic cupboard reflexively, these choice word-vessels may be taken
for granted. Thus, only rarely are their subtle shadings really looked at.
Whether the full possibilities of "care" and "loyalty" can be put to
service in contemporary corporate law discourse about director duties
depends, at the theoretical level, on two matters. First, corporate law must
decide whether the director, to whom the duties of loyalty and care legally
attach, is to be regarded as a full-fledged, human, moral actor. Enduring
stories of human loyalty-for example, that of the humbled Roman
statesman and general Cincinnatus," 3 or Joseph in the book of
Genesis' 2 -uplift us because the actors do more than eschew self-interest.
These figures freely choose to advance the interests of others.'
25
'Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALL. REv. 795, 832 (1983); Deborah Demott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879, 902-05.
Alexander, supra note 92, at 777.
13The Story of Cincinnatus, as retold by James Baldwin, in BENNETr, supra note 94, at
671-74.
'24 Genesis 39, THE HOLY BIBLE (New International Version).
I1d. at 39:12.
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Cincinnatus left home and work to lead Rome for sixteen crucial days
before relinquishing power, while Joseph not only refused to sleep with the
boss' wife, 26 his faithful efforts served to prosper his master both in house
and field.'
The language of loyalty is fitting for such persons. Although flawed,
strenuously challenged, and subjected to severe temptation, they freely
choose allegiance to another. For instance, in Verdi's renowned opera, II
Trovatore,128 Leonora offers herself to Count di Luna in exchange for the
Count sparing the life of his rival, her beloved Manrico. Manrico initially
curses Leonora for "selling" her love, but when the poison she secretly
swallows takes hold and Manrico sees the distress caused by his response
to Leonora's sacrificial act, he understands the extent of her deep devotion
to him. 29 Moral language suits Leonora's actions. She is loyal in more
than the nonbetrayal sense; that is, she is fully loyal in her commitment to
Manrico's well-being.
30
Conversely, moral language is ill-fitting and risks debasement if used
to describe persons who are not genuinely regarded as full-blown moral
actors at all, but who are instrumentally conceived of as economic
functionaries. This principle fully applies to corporate directors. If they
are perceived in purely economic terms, then moral language should be
discarded or at least rendered innocuous. In its place, we could substitute,
as more suitable and honest, the compressed discourse of finance and
economics, with talk of "bargain," "efficiency," and "agency costs."
Moreover, perhaps the rhetoric of game theory and its arid description of
changed behavior as "tipping" will be adopted.' 3' It is not that these
economic notions are not important ideas. Rather, the issue is whether one
or another mode of discourse will predominate to the detriment and
exclusion of moral discourse.
Importantly, it bears further remembering that the received terms of
professional discourse reflect not just a depiction of how we think an area
of human endeavor actually does work, but also how it could work. As
1
26Id.
'Id. at 39:5. Other stirring examples of loyalty found in the Old Testament include
Jonathan's devotion to his friend and future-King David, even in the face of Jonathan's father's
(King Saul's) hatred of David, and Naomi's attachment to her mother-in-law, Ruth, in preference
to her own interests. I Samuel 20 & Ruth 1, THE HOLY BIBLE (New International Version). In
the religious setting, of course, these stories transcend personal loyalty and point to (and illustrate)
the devotion of God to His People.
'"Giuseppe Verdi, II Trovatore (1857).
1291d.
1301d.
131Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1264.
2003]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
James Hunter stated: "Language itself provides horizons for our moral
imaginations." 32 We should be careful about too quickly discarding or
unduly confining an established vocabulary, as the Girl Scouts have already
done and as Easterbrook and Fischel suggest for corporate law, on the
ground that it falsely depicts what is observed. To be sure, descriptive
inaccuracy is always possible and should be guarded against. The function
of moral discourse, however, unlike scientific discourse, is to help us
transcend actual practice, to imagine it with fresh eyes, and to contemplate
and inspire movement toward reform. This distinction will be central to
our eventual willingness to assess Enron as a moral failure and not simply
an accounting blunder or a regulatory foul-up. We need at our disposal
moral categories and moral discourse before we can make such an
assessment.
A second matter needs attention as part of settling on the terms of
corporate law discourse. This concerns how we conceptualize corporate
relationships. Free market contractarians who regard the corporation solely
as a "nexus of contracts" utterly ignore the "nexus of affection and
sympathy," 133 which binds social actors together and "leads people to share
one another's sorrows and joys."'" In doing so, they disaggregate the cor-
poration as a social institution into bargain-making economic actors, who
act not out of self-sacrificing sympathy and devotion, but solely to
maximize individual welfare. This is a theoretical view rooted in social
atomism. Loyalty, in this theory of corporate relationships is at best a
utilitarian, if quaint notion aimed at proscribing "agents" (directors) from
betraying their "principals" (shareholders). At worst, loyalty (understood
as devotion to another) is a pathetic illusion. Yet, loyal conduct frequently
is not veiled self-interest. 13- Is that how the heroic actions of rescue
workers on September 11 are best explained? Few in society at large or in
academia would choose "self interest" to describe what are acts of self-
sacrifice. Moreover, as Hirschman famously notes, the norm of loyalty is
not irrational, but is "socially useful" in inhibiting influential persons from
exiting rather than "staying behind" to improve an organization, thereby
'32HUNTER, supra note 57, at 24; see supra text accompanying note 121.
133ROGER SCRUTON, AN INTELUGENT PERsoN'S GUIDE TO PHILOsOPHY 13 (1998).
1'3la
"'See Johnson, supra note 21, at 895 n.1 13 (quoting Richard Epstein, The Independence
of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory 39 (Sept. 13, 1989) (paper
delivered at Washington and Lee University School of Law) (on file with author) ("Mheory must
deal with the most powerful counterexamples of persons who do appear to behave with
disinterested benevolence to their fellow man .... Such is in accord with our considered
intuitions about self-interests, as with David Hume's wonderful phrase, 'self-interest with confin'd
generosity.'").
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possibly halting further decline. 36 Society gains when a rescue worker
"stays behind" rather than flees. Likewise, the same result occurs, though
less dramatically, when directors, officers, and employees do so in
corporate life.
There is, in the contract model, no moral quality to the director
conduct sought, only the fulfillment (or breach) of already bargained-for
behavior that in turn rationally advances self-interest.'37 Spontaneous,
devoted behavior exceeding what was agreed to defies explanation in the
contractarian account. The exception is forward-looking behavior
instrumentally calculated to signal trustworthiness, which thereby induces
others to transact future business with the actor--to the actor's advantage.
This position dismisses the moral dimension of "economic" actors by
asserting that action supposedly taken out of normative commitment
actually is rooted in self-interest. It is simply the case, the argument goes,
that as yet we have "no psychological account""' to explain how or why
such self-interested action gets converted into moral-sounding (and self-
deceiving) claims that action is normatively grounded.'39 Moreover,
because this theoretical position successfully disassembles the corporate
institution, both sociologically and philosophically, there remains no
"superpersonal entity to serve as [loyalty's] object."'" After all, loyalty as
devotion requires the existence of another to whom one can be
committed. 4' As such, in the austere contractarian account, there is no
meaningful notion of institutional loyalty-as in director loyalty to the
corporate enterprise, as distinct from loyalty only to shareholders 142-nor
'36HIRSCHMAN, supra note 65, at 79, 98-105.
'"Martha Nussbaum argues that, starting with Aristotle, observers of human behavior
have contended that people act out of sympathy for and commitment to others as well as out of
self-interest. This position, she notes "has been argued throughout the history of Western
philosophy." Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a
Particular Type oJ) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1197, 1211 (1997).
138Russell Hardin, Law And Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REv. 1821, 1832
(2000).
1391d.
'4LADD, supra note I, at 97.
141See supra note 64.
'In legal doctrine, director duties are said to be owed to the "corporation and its
stockholders." See Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative
Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CoRP. L. 35,46 (1988). Professor Chapman's non-
instrmentalist account of why corporate managers might care about non-shareholder
constituencies (described as "corporate interests") in 1980s hostile takeover settings builds on the
loyalty-shaping effect of management's sustained interactions with employees compared with
more fleeting interchanges with the largely anonymous group of shareholders. Bruce Chapman,
Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547,
582 (1993). To the extent director capability to do so is considered "slack" to be eliminated by
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is serious attention given to the likelihood that humans do not simply
satisfy given preferences through social/corporate interaction. Possibly,
those preferences might actually be shaped by and altered through such
interchanges. In the contractarian view, for Enron directors and officers
to be loyal to Enron as a company is ludicrous.
Moreover, the "nexus of contracts" theory wrongly regards all social
relations, including corporate relationships, as entirely voluntary. Many
social groupings are consensual only to the extent that exit is not
exercised.'43 A young child does not choose or in any meaningful way
"voluntarily" associate with his or her family, and although workers may
choose their employer, they often do not select their co-workers, bosses,
customers, suppliers, or the host of other persons encountered in the
workplace.'" Stockholders and directors likewise do not "voluntarily"
associate with the myriad persons comprising the corporate enterprise. Yet,
in each case, many such actors for reasons not entirely or even
predominantly economic, routinely display loyalty never asked for or even
remotely expected, thereby enriching the lives around them. Joseph, sold
into slavery by brothers he did not choose, loyally provided for them years
later. '4 Moral language not only expresses the human capacity for such
conduct, it invites us to respond to such conduct. We discover an inner
resonance with such selfless conduct and learn (or at least wonder whether)
we too can, at least occasionally, transcend self-centeredness. An Enron
director or officer who regularly hears moral language can morally reflect,
and can then consider what the morally correct, rather than the expedient,
course of conduct might be.
In the end, Easterbrook and Fischel have no patience for a moral
dimension to loyalty in their account of corporate law for the simple reason
that, in their view, it serves no purpose.'" Neither loyalty nor any other
bolstering shareholder influence through various corporate governance measures, including
fiduciary law, the opportunities for director demonstration of loyalty to non-shareholders may
decline. This legal change, in turn, may reduce the corporate institution's capacity to inculcate
a norm of loyalty running in favor of any group other than shareholders. The norm itself may then
wither. On the other hand, to the extent corporate law tolerates "slack" in how directors act, it
preserves room for fostering loyalty.
"3As Professor Chapman notes with respect to Albert Hirschman's view: "Loyalty raises
the costs of exit for committed members so that they will not exit at the first opportunity
promising a higher rate of return." Chapman, supra note 142, at 588 n.78.
'""C.S. Lewis once said one of the great benefits ofinvoluntary communities-including
the family-is that "they enable us to discover the virtues of people whom we might never have
chosen to hang out with." Dinesh D'Souza, No Substitute for the Real Thing, THE CHRISTIAN
SciENCE MoNrroR 9 (Oct. 30, 2000).
145Genesis 45:1-15. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
'"Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117, at 434.
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moral qualities are necessary in an instrumental "worldview whose moral
center is the autonomous self and whose moral ends are personal well-
being.""4  By triumphantly asserting that moral rhetoric is more "a
proposition about judges rather than about rules,"'"" they fail to see what a
relief that is. Less smitten by rules in the fiduciary area than Easterbrook
and Fischel, and believing judges can and should infuse fiduciary law with
widely-shared cultural norms,'49 this article applauds what they decry.
Moreover, if their point is that modes of discourse reveal normative tilt,
then their preferred mode of economic discourse is itself "a proposition
about" their own normative preferences, rather than an entirely accurate
description of socially and morally complex human relationships.
This second matter, the nature of social bonds in the corporation, is
closely linked to the first matter of whether we conceive the corporate
director wholly as an instrumentally rational economic agent or as a more
complex moral actor. If human interaction within the corporation is only,
or primarily, understood as financial/economic and calculating in nature,
then moral, sociological, psychological, and historical discourse about
director duties in evocative terms like "care" and "loyalty" is as out of place
as talk of balls and strikes at a football game. A conspicuous difference for
modem corporate law, however, is that for many decades the core terms of
fiduciary discourse---care and loyalty-have not been those of a specialized
sub-vocabulary but rather are drawn from the laiger sphere of moral-social
discourse.' There, the core notions have a rich and shared (but still open-
ended) meaning, rather than a thin and peculiar significance.
The historic decision within corporate law initially to deploy a moral
vocabulary suggests a view that a moral subject matter was under
'47HUNTER, supra note 57, at 160. Professor Hunter goes on to report the results of a
study relating how children's underlying moral outlook shaped behavior. In that study, the
children most likely to cheat, lie, steal, and least likely to express restraint in sexual matters or
show compassion toward others, were expressivists and utilitarians. Id. at 163-70.
1casterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117, at 434.
"'As stated by former Chancellor William Allen: "[C]orporation law exists, not as an
isolated body of rules and principles, but rather in a historical setting and as part of a larger body
of law premised upon shared values." City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d
787, 799-800 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed as moot, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
"Numerous fiduciary cases in the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth
century, for example, cited the biblical prohibition against serving two masters in their discussions
of loyalty. See, e.g., Beasley v. Swinton, 24 S.E. 313, 322 (S.C. 1896); see Harlan Stone, The
Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1934) (commenting on the fiduciary principle
of loyalty, "the precept as old as holy writ, that 'a man cannot serve two masters'). With respect
to how morality pervades fiduciary law, Tamar Frankel cogently notes: "Courts regulate
fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon them. This moral theme is an important
part of fiduciary law. Loyalty, fidelity, faith, and honor form its basic vocabulary." Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 829-30 (1983).
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consideration.' Having inherited that vocabulary, the question for modern
corporate fiduciary scholarship after twenty-five years of intense absorption
with law and economics is whether to continue to explore director duties
in the fullness of customary moral terms." 2 Likewise, judges facing the
task of deciding whether director wrongdoing implicates loyalty rather than
care must choose whether to embrace or renounce the fullest meanings of
those norms. Through all the dynamic tumult in corporate law since the
1970s, the core vocabulary of"loyalty" and "care" has endured. Advocates
of renouncing the received vocabulary, or of translating it into a dialect of
finance/economic or game theory talk, believe either that corporate law
discourse should no longer draw on terms with larger social-moral
significance or that those terms are pass6 and meaningless in that larger
sphere as well. The consequences of translating moral problems into the
alluring and seemingly precise language of a utilitarian or quantitative
calculus are captured by philosopher Roger Scruton:
Those who wish to reduce such [moral] reasoning to an
econometric calculation rid the moral question of its
distinctive character, and replace it with questions of another
kind--questions concerning "preference orderings," "opti-
mizing" and "satisficing" solutions, and rational choice under
conditions of risk and uncertainty. By shaping the moral
question so that it can be fed into the machinery of
economics, we do not solve it. On the contrary, we put a
fantasy problem for experts in place of the painful reality of
moral choice. If the answer to moral questions were really to
be found in decision theory, then most people would be
unable to discover it. In which case morality would lose its
function as a guide to life, offered to all of us by the fact of
reasoned dialogue.'53
"'David Sciulli points out that Edward Rock's use of religious metaphors to describe the
conduct of equity courts is apt because the first English chancellors were clerics. DAVID SCIULLI,
CoRPoRATE PoWER IN CiVu. SOCIETY 371 n.44 (2001).
'For former Chancellor William Allen's argument that directors are "members of moral
communities with allegiances to moral codes," see William T. Allen, The Corporate Director's
Fiduciary Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule Under US. Corporate Law, in
COMPARATIE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 330 (State of the Art and Emerging Research, Klaus
J. Hopt et al., eds. 1998). For another approach to exploring the role of morality-specifically,
moral desires-in corporate governance, see Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a
Market with Morality, 62 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBs. 129 (Summer 1999).
. 3SCRUTON, supra note 133, at 124.
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The renderings given to the term "loyalty" in the years ahead--as the
full ramifications of Enron are more widely debated-will reflect far more
than sharedadherence to or rejection of a singular economic description of
the corporation. They will, to the extent corporate law still draws on
deeper social currents, measure as well the continued strength of a social-
moral preference for loyal, care-giving conduct. This is true outside and
within corporate law discourse. This is especially so after Enron.
IV. JUDGING AND THE NOTION OF DUE LOYALTY
A. Interpretive Judging
Continuing judicial exploration ofthe contours and boundaries ofthe
duty of loyalty is inevitable. This is true, in part, because lawyers for
unhappy stockholders will argue that director misconduct should be
characterized as falling within one of the four exceptions to section
102(bX7) and similar statutes, thereby permitting an award of monetary
damages. 1
54
Initially, there is the question of statutory interpretation. What do
the four exceptions mean? " Specifically, how does the first "duty of
loyalty" exception in the statute differ from the second exception for acts
or omissions "not in good faith" or which involve "intentional misconduct,"
and from the fourth exception "for any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit?"'56 Delaware courts have branded
conduct falling within the second ("not in good faith") exception as
implicating loyalty,'57 which was recently illustrated by alleged bad faith
disclosure violations. "' Likewise, the fourth ("improper personal benefit")
See supra note 12.
'..See supra note 12.
"'See supra note 12.
""Gaylord Container S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475-76, n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(analyzing relationship between good faith and loyalty). See Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48-
49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000). The chancery court reasoned that:
[i]f it is useful at all as an independent concept, the good faith iteration's utility
may rest in its constant reminder (1) that a fiduciary may act disloyally for a
variety of reasons other than pecuniary interest, and (2) that, regardless of his
motive, a director who consciously disregards his duties to the corporation and
its stockholders may suffer a personal judgment for monetary damages for any
harm he causes.
Id.
'"Johnson v. Shapiro, No. 17,651, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at '29-*31 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 18, 2002), reprinted in 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 372, 373 (2003) (providing that reckless failure
to disclose may constitute bad faith); O'Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902,915
(Del. Ch. 1999) (providing that "[w]here a complaint alleges or pleads facts sufficient to support
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exception, as illustrated by director self-dealing transactions, has been
described as raising a loyalty issue." 9 Yet, in the statute itself, the loyalty
exception explicitly is set apart from those two categories of conduct. This
suggests a broader scope for the duty of loyalty that includes (but is not
limited to) bad faith and self-dealing, and the possibility it is amenable to
a more expansive reading."6
A recent example of giving the loyalty exception in section 102(bX7)
a fuller reading is a chancery court decision holding that personally disin-
terested directors of a parent corporation also serving on the board of a
subsidiary may not take action at the subsidiary level that is disloyal to the
parent. 61 The court stated that directors of a parent corporation have a
duty, in such a situation, to act in the best interests of the parent. 162 A
"supine reaction" by the directors supports a claim for breach of the duty
of loyalty. 63 The court reasoned that any other approach would "gut the
duty of loyalty."" Additionally, Vice Chancellor Jacobs' recent opinion
in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 65 after remand, addressed director loyalty
where there was neither a personal nor a positional conflict. Among other
claims, plaintiff-stockholders charged that four of the five directors had
breached their duty of loyalty in approving a merger between the
corporation and thirteen other corporations controlled by the fifth director
who also was the CEO.'"
As noted by the court, the non-affiliated directors had no adverse
personal interest in the merger, and they received no benefit from that
the inference that the disclosure violation was made in bad faith, knowingly or intentionally, the
alleged violation implicates the duty of loyalty").
'"Grace Bros. Ltd. v. Uniholding Corp., No. 17,612, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101, at *35-
*36 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2000), reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 304, 331 (2002). The court noted:
Arguably, the improper personal benefits provision of § 102(b)(7Xiv) could be
seen as preventing a director from benefiting from his own gross negligence in
the context of a self-dealing transaction, but this, too, can properly be seen as
raising loyalty concerns, given that it involves a fiduciary who has personally
benefited from his own lack of care ....
Id.
"United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955). In interpreting a statute, it
is the court's duty to "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." Id




'"See id. at *41, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CoRP. L. at 323.
'"No. 9700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2001), vacated and remanded,
787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).
'"Id. at *65.
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transaction other than as shareholders of the company.'67 Nor did the
plaintiff claim that the non-affiliated directors, because of material
financial or personal relationships, were disabled from acting indepen-
dently of the CEO or in the company's and its, public stockholders' best
interests. 61 Equally, there was no basis to assert that the directors were
under the CEO's control, as all directors were independent, successful
businessmen long before they met the CEO, and none was beholden to
him. 169 In this non-conflict setting, the plaintiffs duty of loyalty claim
rested squarely on the theory of director "'indifference to their duty to
protect the interests of the corporation and its minority shareholders,""70 a
theory recently recognized in Strassburger v. Earley.7'
Vice Chancellor Jacobs first distinguished Strassburger by noting
that in that case two of four directors worked as well-paid employees of the
majority shareholder, which had sold its controlling stock interest back to
the corporation.." This sale enlarged the president's personal stock
ownership position from 6.9% to 55%. 1' Although they did not personally
gain from the repurchase, the Strassburger court found that the loyalty of
the two directors to their employer had made them "indifferent" to their
duty of loyalty to protect the corporation and its minority stockholders. 4
In contrast, the Emerald Partners court found that the merger in that case
did "benefit all May stockholders," 75 and that there was no evidence the
non-affiliated directors had acted "other than with the best interests of the
minority shareholders in mind."'76 Indeed, Vice Chancellor Jacobs found
that the directors' decisions had affirmatively furthered the interests of the
minority stockholders.'"
The Emerald Partners court clearly acknowledged the affirmative
thrust of loyalty; however, it found that directors had fulfilled that duty.'78
16Id
uIId.
"EmeraldPartners, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *65.
'"Id. at *69 (quoting Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 581 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
"'752 A.2d 557, 581 (Del. Ch. 2000).
1Id.
1Id. at 561, 564.
1741d. at 581.
"'Emerald Partners, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *80.
1761d at *82.
'l1 at *84.
'"Id. at *85. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the chancery
court had allowed the company's exculpatory provision to unduly limit its level of judicial
scrutiny, holding that such a provision should only be considered where "entire fairness" is the
standard after a liability determination has been made. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85
(Del. 2001).
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Imagine such an affirmative conception of loyalty on the Slrassburger facts
but without the dual director loyalty existing in that case. Vice Chancellor
Jacobs' emphasis on the benefit to minority stockholders suggests that the
affirmative dimension of director loyalty would not have been fulfilled in
Strassburger on those facts. 9 A recent illustration of this arose where a
plaintiff-stockholder described as "faithless" the behavior of a disinterested
director in allowing the CEO/director to take personally an opportunity to
purchase thirty percent of the corporation's stock for $1,000 at a time when
it was worth substantially more. 8 By not acting to pursue the opportunity
for the corporation itself, the director ignored "a particularly striking
'opportunity' for the corporation to benefit its stockholders.""8 ' In Kohls,
Vice Chancellor Lamb, noting plaintiffs reliance on Strassburger to
contend that the director's "inexplicable indifference to the interests of the
Company in this matter ... implicate[s] his duty of loyalty," denied a
motion to dismiss after concluding the director faced a substantial
likelihood of personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty. 82
As shown by these illustrative cases, the interpretive task ultimately
requires courts to confront the central issue addressed in this article: What
does loyalty mean in corporate law and what materials will be drawn on to
answer this question? Corporate law discourse" contains both the minimal
and maximal strands of loyalty, though the former is considerably more
developed. Moreover, at a philosophical level it is hard to draw a sharp
boundary between robust conceptions of loyalty and care, though for
reasons quite different than those stated by Easterbrook and Fischel."
This suggests that contemporary corporate law has neither a singular, fully-
developed notion of loyalty nor a settled view of the precise borderline
between the duties of care and loyalty. These matters are for the first time
in the process of being worked out as courts, against the backdrop of
corporate scandal and Congress's response to it, 85 must say with greater
precision what sort of director misconduct implicates loyalty (allowing
damages) and what sort implicates only care (prohibiting damages). Before
enactment of section 102(b)(7), it was enough to find a fiduciary breach of
"'Strassburger, 752 A.2d at 581.
'"See, e.g., Kohls v. Duthie, 791 A.2d 772,778 (Del. Ch. 2000), rev. refd, 765 A.2d 950
(Del. 2000).
"'Id. at 784. See Bomarko, Inc. v. International Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1178
(Del. Ch. 1999) (reasoning that a director is disloyal where his actions "interfered with the other
directors' efforts to benefit ... shareholders"), affd, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000).
1-Kohls, 791 A.2d at 782.
"See supra text accompanying notes 38-50, 79-90.
-USee supra notes 31, 117.
'See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2002).
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some sort, at least for purposes of awarding damages, whether it was
grounded in care, loyalty or both.
B. Policy Judging
Realizing that corporate law has not finished grappling with the task
of articulating the full reach of loyalty (and its relationship to care), and
that philosophical, artistic, and sociological sources suggest this duty is a
rich notion, how do judges actually stake out a sensible dividing line
between care and loyalty? This raises a threshold policy question. Are
there (or might there be) instances of director wrongdoing in addition to
breach of the minimal condition of loyalty that should be sanctionable by
an award of money damages on policy grounds? Might shareholders ex
ante find this desirable? Does this first require a clearer reckoning of the
gains from such a possibility as weighed against possible losses, such as
discouraging highly qualified prospective director candidates and inducing
incumbent directors to engage in overly risk-adverse behavior. "6 Put
another way, does section 102(b)(7) leave too much director misconduct
unsanctionable by damages if loyalty is narrowly construed to mean only
the avoidance of director self-gain?" 7
This raises the issue of the proper role of monetary sanctions for
director misconduct in a sound corporate governance regime. This was
precisely the issue triggered by Smith v. Van Gorkom"'8 in 1985, promptly
addressed in 1986 by passage of section 102(bX7), and in 2003 still lurking
beneath the surface as judges seek to categorize wrongdoing as "care" or
"loyalty" in nature. 89 Will we get better conduct from Enron directors if
they face some appreciable risk of monetary sanctions, or will such a risk
make it more difficult to attract high-quality directors, resulting in poorer
corporate governance? If monetary damages are thought in certain settings
to be inappropriate on policy grounds, then the statutory exception for the
"duty of loyalty" should be given a narrow reading. This would be done by
'"In this regard, given that § 102(b)(7) is an opt-in provision, one wonders both what was
(and is) said to stockholders about the kind ofdirector conduct still sanctionable by damages when
stockholders are asked to consent to adoption of exculpation. Also, one wonders what
stockholders think is being given up-and what is being retained-by way of ability to sue
directors for damages. At a minimum, directors seeking shareholder approval must fulfill their
duty of disclosure. See supra note 46. Beyond that, one wonders what the parties believe is being
relinquished and retained.
""7See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
1-488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
'S"This issue will emerge as central when the interaction of the federal Sarbanes-Oxley
Act's mandates for corporate directors and state law fiduciary standards raises director liability
questions.
2003]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
limiting loyalty to the minimum condition, by reading the duty of care
broadly, or both. On the other hand, there might be a subset of director
conduct that, although not characterizable as either a breach of process-
oriented due care or the betrayal aspect of loyalty, should be sanctionable
(not the same as always being sanctioned) by damages. Preserving judicial
discretion to sanction such conduct will require a broader construction of
loyalty. This would be done both by interpreting loyalty as going beyond
nonbetrayal and reading care narrowly to mean only the process-oriented
duty to act "with care." This approach leaves at least portions of the "take
care of" and "care for" dimensions of director responsibility to the realm of
affirmative loyalty. s To the extent these responsibilities are housed within
the duty of loyalty, their breach will subject directors to the risk of
monetary damages.
The issue of whether loyalty should be construed to have minimum
and maximum dimensions is not entirely dependent on the appropriateness
of money damages for breach of director loyalty. One possible approach
is to allow damages for breach of the minimum condition, but to allow no
damages or a capped or formulaic dollar amount (e.g., return of the past
year's director compensation) for other breaches of loyalty. Another
possibility is to consider a board's (or individual director's) state of
knowledge. A director who deliberately neglects or deliberately violates
known duties is a stronger candidate for a monetary sanction than one less
culpable. 9' Each of these approaches would usefully acknowledge the
fullness of the duty of loyalty while reserving money damages for only a
subset of loyalty violations. In that event, a noncompensable breach of
loyalty would, as with a breach of care, support equitable relief or amount
to an infringement of a legally recognized but non-legally enforceable
norm."9 Currently, the duty of loyalty exception in section 102(bX7) and
other similar statutes does not distinguish among types of loyalty
breaches. " To the extent a rich duty of loyalty is thought to be
'"See supra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
"..Vice Chancellor Leo Strine made this point to the author. Professor Anderson, supra
note 31, at 758 n.59, also notes that disloyalty may be regarded as more "unfair" than laziness or
carelessness because it involves a "more deliberate form of self-preference." The element of
deliberateness may, as the vice chancellor suggests, serve as one partial "marker" for identifying
conduct as raising a loyalty issue for purposes of sanctioning inappropriate conduct.
' 2Professors Edward Rock and Michael Wachter have coined the phrase "nonlegally
enforceable rules and standards" to express this idea. See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the Self Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 1619 (2001).
'
3See supra note 12.
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normatively desirable,'" but also that not all such breaches should support
damages, the statutory loyalty exception is overinclusive and should be
amended. The exception might be modified so that damages are permitted
only where directors directly or indirectly procured gain from their breach,
or where they deliberately or recklessly acted wrongly.
The availability of only equitable relief for breach of affirmative
loyalty actually may serve to induce judges to give that duty a broader
reading and stricter enforcement. Just as judges might be more inclined to
upgrade corporate practice by finding care breaches if only equitable
remedies obtain, judges might more readily find loyalty breaches through
a fuller reading of loyalty if such breaches supported only equitable
remedies or limited damages. In interpreting section 102(b)(7) and similar
statutes,judges might be overcharacterizing director misconduct as care in
nature because of a policy concern about damages, even though it would be
better in some instances to preserve the harsher, more potentially shameful
verdict of a loyalty breach,' ifthat could be done without an excessive and
counter-productive damage award. The thrust of this distinction is
bolstered if stronger corporate disclosure rules or practices increase the
likelihood that shareholders will learn about director misdeeds in sufficient
time to seek equitable relief, thereby reducing the relative importance of
monetary sanctions.'"
C. Doctrinal Judging
Answers to some of the questions raised above may lie in well-
designed empirical work. Absent empirical evidence or statutory reform,
however, these sorts of policy questions will surely be on judges' minds as
they decide whether particular director conduct does or does not concern
loyalty. For example, is a judge likely to impose damages on a director
who did not personally benefit from a disloyal decision? On the other
hand, how healthy is contemporary corporate law if fiduciaries who behave
'"See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1597 (2000) ("The primary way to prompt people to
instill civic virtue in each other is by aligning law with morality.").
' Vice Chancellor Lamb has observed that "where... issues of loyalty are involved,
potentially harsher rules come into play." Bomarko, Inc. v. International Telecharge, Inc., 794
A.2d 1161, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999), affd, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000). The supreme court also has
emphasized the importance of sound remedies for disloyalty: "Delaware law dictates that the
scope of recovery for a breach of the duty of loyalty is not to be determined narrowly .... The
strict imposition of penalties under Delaware law are designed to discourage disloyalty." Thorpe
v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996).
'Professor Adam Pritchard made this point to the author. It remains to be seen if stricter
corporate disclosure practices under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will have this effect.
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disloyally do not face some risk of reasonable monetary damages? Judicial
probing of these issues will be enhanced by a mode of discourse that,
although rooted in history, is not mere vernacular but is capacious enough
to allow growth and change. This author suggests use of the concept "due
loyalty." The key loyalty inquiry is the same in corporate law as elsewhere
in that "[wie must ask what loyalty demands of a person."" 7 Expressing
the same idea pragmatically: "The problem is working out the limits of
loyalty. "1198
The word "loyalty" comes from the French word loi, meaning
"law."' Loyal behavior is behavior owed by reason of law, moral or
positive. It is that which is "due" in a particular context. The requirement
is not abstract. It is not compliance with a purely theoretical standard of
loyalty that is demanded, but "due" loyalty which is demanded. This means
the loyalty sufficient for, and properly proportioned and owed to, the
particular setting.2'" James Hunter reminds us that: "Morality is always
situated-historically situated in the narrative flow of collective memory
and aspiration, socially situated within distinct communities, and culturally
situated within particular structures of moral reasoning and practice."
21'
Corporate law, with its distinctive vocabulary, practices, and membership,
is the community where generally-shared norms (like loyalty) are discussed
and implemented in a very particular institutional setting. This means the
Delaware Court of Chancery, a court of equity, should frame the pertinent
inquiry to be whether the director's duty of "due loyalty" was fulfilled or
breached under specific circumstances. Over time, this will lead to the
articulation of"rules," but these rules are simply particularized expressions
'"LADD, spra note 1, at 98.
'"FLETCHER, supra note 51, at 151.
'"LADD, supra note 1, at 98.
-0Albert Hirschman distinguishes "loyalty" and "pure faith" on the ground that "loyalist
behavior retains an enormous dose of reasoned calculation." HIRSCHMAN, supra note 65, at 78-
79. Chapman draws on that conceptual distinction to assert that a loyal actor is blind to a purely
instrumental calculus only to a point. Chapman, supra note 142, at 588 n.78. The use of "due"
loyalty recognizes that admirable loyalty is neither "blind" nor the only norm shaping conduct, and
therefore use of "due" loyalty eliminates the need to distinguish between loyalty and faithfulness
as Hirschman uses those terms.
20HuNTER, supra note 57, at 11. The Delaware Supreme Court also recognizes that
fiduciary duty is contextually specific. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000)
("[C]ommon law fiduciary responsibilities that directors of a Delaware corporation are required
to discharge depends [sic] upon the specific context. ").
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of due loyalty.20 2 Loyalty itself remains a social-moral norm and a legal
standard, never wholly reducible to a precise rule.
Phrasing the inquiry in that fashion avoids the dual temptation to
regard loyalty as a "free-floating abstraction 2 3 or a fixed recipe. Loyalty,
both as a social norm and a legal duty, is like other virtues in being
"malleable, and shaped by... circumstances ... and requir[ing] a social
setting."2 ' Although susceptible to the making of some general "core"
statements about them, the context-sensitive duties of corporate directors
are not best likened to "allegories such as the play Everyman and Pilgrim's
Progress, in which the characters represent abstractions. 2 0 Rather, like
that "dominant flow of our artistic tradition ... [which gives us] great
works of individualization, which pause to delineate the characters notjust
of heroes and seers but also of children, housewives, bureaucrats,
prostitutes, and tax collectors, of swineherds and old nurses and
animals, 006 the "due loyalty" inquiry focuses on whether a particular moral
actor, embedded in a particular context, provided what was "due" for
furthering the corporation's interests.
Framing the loyalty inquiry in this manner also achieves a certain
analytical symmetry in corporate law by aligning the phrasing of the loyalty
mandate with the phrasing of the care duty. The care duty, in the best
'nProfessor Anderson makes a distinction too often forgotten, i.e., that there are fiduciary
duties and conflict of interest rules. Anderson, supra note 3 1, at 760 & nn.65, 68. "Over the
years more specific content has been given to fiduciary duties by establishing some general rules
of behavior .... On the whole, however, fiduciary duties are not defined in any detail but simply
require the fiduciary to act fairly in the client's interest." Id.
2HUNTER, supra note 57, at 11.
2 SCRUTON, stipra note 133, at 114-15.
2w'WENDELL BERRY, LIFE Is A MiRACLE 114 (2000). Mr. Berry goes on to remark that
while literary characters '"stand for' us humans... they are each also intransigently themselves,
and are valued as such. They all come out of the common fund of human experience, and so we
recognize them, but not one of them is the same as anybody else." Id.
'Id. David Skeel's emphasis on the narrative (rather than strictly doctrinal) form of
corporate law judicial opinions highlights the importance of individualization: "Doctrinal
expositions, like the Ten Commandments or the Delaware statute, have their place; but difficult
questions of good faith demand the particularities that only narrative structure can provide."
David A. Skeel, Jr., Saul and David and Corporate Takeover Law 15 1, 169 in LrrERATURE AND
LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING (Paul J. Heald ed. 1998). Mae Kuykendall also believes that:
[corporate law] will benefit from a guiding framework that proposes a narrative
structure for a socially embedded set of stories about the sort of people who
inhabit the corporate world, both the concrete setting and the legal constructs...
[Such stories] contain nuance, accommodate complexity about human motives,
avoid cant and inspire interest ....
Mae Kuykendall, Comment on Kostant: Tune in to hear stories of corporate governance, the
adventure of the go-between and more exciting tales of corporate law, 28 J. Socbo-EcoN. 259,
263 (1999).
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opinions, °7 is described as the duty of "due care." This rightly
acknowledges the context-specific, equitable nature of fiduciary inquiry.
The same should hold true for loyalty, preserving that domain against
capture by either a substantive rule-based or an entirely process-oriented
"one size fits all" mindset.208
Expressing the analysis as an exploration of"due loyalty" accurately
captures the formative nature of what courts are being asked to do in
interpreting section 102(b)(7) and similar statutes. Courts must cultivate
a sensibility for deploying the one remaining robust duty-loyalty-to
serve as the mainstay of corporate fiduciary law's imposition of monetary
sanctions. Classifying director wrongdoing as care or loyalty requires, as
noted above, that certain interpretive and policy issues be addressed,
including a determination of whether customary policy rationales for
judicial deference in the care context apply in particular instances. If
nonliability for misconduct is necessary to induce appropriate risk-taking
behavior on the part of directors or to attract high-quality persons to serve
as directors, then a court is more likely to characterize the wrongdoing as
constituting a care breach.' If those rationales do not apply-and
interpreting section 102(b)(7) may afford an opportune occasion for finally
taking a hard look at whether those rationales truly apply to the duty of care
or only to the more modest business judgment rule2 0-- then a court is more
likely to consider classifying the misconduct as raising a loyalty issue.
Furthermore, as noted earlier,2 ' the deliberativeness of director conduct is
an appropriate consideration in framing whether conduct raises a loyalty or
care concern.
Beyond a capacity to accommodate policy concerns, however, the
concept of "due loyalty," to be useful for judging, must be fitted into
existing procedural practice, such as allocation of the burdens of pleading
and proof and standard of judicial review. For example, the Delaware
Supreme Court recently stated that the shield from liability provided by
207See, e.g., Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997) ("The business
judgment rule is a presumption that directors are acting independently, in good faith and with due
care in making a business decision."); Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 689 (Del. Ch.
1996) (" [O]ur law presumes that in making a [business] decision..., the directors acted with due
care and in good faith to advance the best interests of shareholders.").
'zsSee Victor Brudney, Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for Corporate
Fiduciary Obligation, 25 J. CORP. L. 209 (2000) (criticizing procedural approach to loyalty).
" Goodwin v. Live Entrn't, Inc., No. 15,765, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at *76 n.17 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 22, 1999), reprinted in 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1084, 1129 n.17 (1999), affid 741 A.2d 16
(Del. 1999).
210See Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAw. 625 (2000).
"'See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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section 102(b)(7) is in the nature of an affirmative defense and that
defendants bear the burden of establishing each of its elements.2"2 Thus,
defendants must demonstrate compliance with the duty of loyalty unless
"the factual basis for a claim solely implicates a violation of the duty of
care. 213
Two Delaware Supreme Court decisions have brought some clarity
and introduced additional uncertainty.1 4 Malpiede v. Towson clarified that:
although an exculpatory charter provision is "in the nature of
an affirmative defense," simply proving the existence of a
valid exculpatory provision in the corporate charter entitles
directors to a dismissal of any claims for money damages
against them that are based on alleged breaches of the duty of
care.
215
Thus, where only duty of care violations are alleged, no determination of
liability at trial is necessary and pretrial dismissal is appropriate. In
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, however, the supreme court reversed the lower
court decision because it had considered the effect of an exculpatory
charter provision before determining liability.2"6
The court in Emerald Partners distinguished Malpiede as involving
a business judgment rule standard of review while in Emerald Partners the
standard "ab initio" was "entire fairness. '2 7 The court ruled that where the
latter standard applies, liability can only be determined by a judicial
finding that "entire fairness" is lacking and ajudicial articulation of which
duty or duties were breached such that unfairness resulted.218 If the duty
breached was the duty of care, only then will the exculpatory provision be
a bar to damages.
The supreme court's suggested reconciling of its two decisions based
on the applicable standard of review is not entirely satisfactory. Under
212McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 926 (Del. 2000); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726
A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999). But see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (assigning burden to
plaintiff). For a discussion of the Model Act's approach to exculpation, see Jesse J. Hanks, Jr.
& Larry P. Scriggins, Protecting Directors and Officers from Liability-The Influence of the
Model Business Corporation Act, 56 Bus. LAW. 3, 25-28 (2000).
213Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1224.
214Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001); Malpiede v. Towson, 780 A.2d
1075 (Del. 2001).
2'5Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1095-96 n.71.
216Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).
'71d. at 92-93.
21 Id. at 94.
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current Delaware law,2 9 a breach of the duty of care rebuts the business
judgment rule and -results in entire fairness review. This standard would
seem to trigger the liability determination called for by Emerald Partners.
This would be a futile determination, however, since money damages
cannot be collected where only care is breached.220
Perhaps the court means that even if sufficient facts are alleged to
rebut the business judgment rule, defendants may still obtain pretrial
dismissal based on an exculpatory provision if the only basis for rebutting
that standard of review is a duty of care breach. Some language in the
opinion supports this reading." On the other hand, the court later speaks
broadly to suggest that once the entire fairness standard is invoked,
exculpation can be granted only after a liability determination has been
made.m Uncertainty on the proper reading of Emerald Partners on this
point quickly emerged in a subsequent chancery court decision.'
The underlying problem is that the supreme courtfs McMullin and
Emerald Partners decisions wrongly treat section 102(b)(7) as being in the
nature of an affirmative defense effecting a burden shift to defendants.
Recall that in a breach of fiduciary duty claim the initial burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to rebut the business judgment rule,224 and that to meet that
burden the plaintiff must "provide evidence""22 that defendant directors
breached any one of their "'triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or
219
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
mEmeraldPartners, 787 A.2d at 92 ("[]f the shareholder complaint only alleges a duty
of care violation, the entry of a monetary judgment following a finding of unfairness would be
uncollectible.").
"Id. ("[W]hen the presumption of the business judgment rule has been rebutted in the
shareholder complaint solely by successfully alleging a duty of care violation, the director
defendants do not have to prove entire fairness to the trier of fact, because of the exculpation
afforded to the directors .... "). In short, entire fairness technically is the applicable standard but
directors need not carry their burden of proof because no damages could be awarded even if they
fail to carry it.
mid at 94 ("We hold that when entire fairness is the applicable standard of judicial
review, a determination that the director defendants are exculpated from paying monetary damages
can be made only after the basis for their liability has been decided.").
mn re Student Loan Corp. Deriv. Litig., No. 17,799,2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 7, at * 13 n.8
(Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2002). Vice Chancellor Strine stated that Emerald Partners:
can be read to hold that when the entire fairness standard applies, even an
independent director cannot obtain dismissal of damage claims against him until
after the fairness of the transaction is determined, regardless of whether the
independent director shows, on a Rule 12(bX6) or Rule 56 motion, that the
plaintiffs have submitted no facts or admissible evidence, as the case may be,
supporting a finding that the independent director committed a non-exculpated
breach of fiduciary duties.
22'Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995).
mSMcMullin, 765 A.2d at 917.
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due care."'226 This means, contrary to the McMullin and Emerald Partners
statements that defendant bears the burden of demonstrating loyalty where
section 102(b)(7) is at issue, that plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and
producing evidence of a breach of loyalty. The significance of plaintiff
pleading and providing evidence of such a breach (or, depending on the
burden allocation, a defendant failing to prove that conduct is care in
nature) is that a breach of loyalty rebuts the business judgment rule's
presumption that the directors have acted in the best interests of the
shareholders.227 The result not only is the possibility of money damages but
also that directors must prove their action was entirely fair.228 Plaintiffs
failure to provide evidence of disloyalty (or, depending on the burden
allocation, defendant's success in proving either that conduct is care in
nature or that it fulfilled its loyalty duty) means that money damages will
be unavailable due to section 102(b)(7), and that the substance of director
conduct will not be reviewed for fairness 9 but only for rationality.23
The supreme court clearly needs to re-address how the protection of
section 102(b)(7) meshes with procedural burdens and existing standards
of review.231 This is important because ofjudicial efficiency concerns and
because burdens and standards of review often are outcome
'Gaylord Container S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475-76 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(quoting Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361).
"'Cede Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993).
'8Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1162-63.
'Vice Chancellor Jacobs, having found that defendants in Emerald Partners had proven
they did not breach their duty of loyalty, did not go on to conduct an "entire fairness" review.
Emerald Partners, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at '68. This was proper in that case because the
supreme court had broadly instructed him to place the burden on defendants. On appeal, the
supreme court saw it differently and remanded. On remand, the court of chancery must first make
a determination under the entire fairness standard of review. If the court determines that the
transaction was entirely fair, the director defendants have no liability for monetary damages. If
the court determines that the transaction was not entirely fair, only then should it address the
§ 102(b)(7) charter provision. The court must consider the director defendants' § 102(b)(7)
request for exculpation in the context of the cowl's finding of unfairness. If director defendants
can establish that the cour's finding of unfairness is exclusively attributable to a violation of the
duty of care, then they can avoid personal liability for paying monetary damages. Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91-93 (Del. 2001).
n°Even under Delaware's business judgment rule review standard, a board decision must
have a "rational business purpose." Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1373 (Del. 1995). An "irrational" decision "may tend to show that the decision is not made in
good faith." Brelm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). This approach avoids Chancellor
Allen's valid policy concern about courts directly reviewing the substance of board actions, even
under a mild "rationality" standard. In re Caremark Intl Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
"'See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
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determinative.232 Apart from that issue, the supreme court should address
how the proposed concept of "due loyalty" fits into the existing procedural
scheme and standards of judicial review for addressing alleged fiduciary
duty breaches.
Where plaintiffs properly pled claim is that directors breached the
minimum condition of loyalty by, for example, a majority of the directors
engaging in self-dealing, those directors would, as under existing law, bear
the burden of proving entire fairness to the court's satisfaction.233 Judicial
review is rather invasive in this instance because widespread director
conflict deprives the stockholders of a "neutral decision-making body." '234
However, where plaintiff contends that director misconduct is not self-
interested in nature, yet violates the affirmative dimension of loyalty as in
Emerald Partners, he should retain the burden to prove directors breached
their duty of"due" loyalty. Shareholders contending that director fiduciary
duties involve more than acting with procedural care and more than
refraining from self-gain should have both the conceptual and procedural
opportunity to do so. However, they should also bear the legal burden to
convince a court that, in a particular context, directors have failed to act
with "due loyalty." The question that arises is what standard of review
should courts apply to this burden? The only judicial standard of review
for assessing a plaintiffs claim, outside of the control change setting,23
appears to be business judgment review. The question now is how can a
shareholder overcome that director-friendly standard?
Recall how Delaware formulates the business judgment rule: "[A]
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
236
Director conduct not involving a business decision-whether it is a
decision to take an action or not take an action237-will not be reviewed
under that standard. Thus, director abdication or failure to discharge
responsibilities is not reviewed under a business judgment standard.238
n2Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 90 (Del. 1992).
233Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995).
'-'Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del.
1994); Cinerama, Inc., 663 A.2d at 1170.
"5 QVC, 637 A.2d at 42.
236Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
2371d. at 813.
"38For example, a director charged with breach of loyalty for failure to pursue an
extraordinary opportunity for the corporation to purchase its own stock at a substantial discount
made no business decision entitling him to review under the business judgment rule standard.
Kohls v. Duthie, 791 A.2d 772, 780 (Del. Ch. 2000), rev. refd, 765 A.2d 950 (Del. 2000). See
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Moreover, such behavior might be regarded not only as a duty of care
breach but also, at least if reckless, as a breach of "due loyalty." 9 As a
procedural presumption, the business judgment standard can be overcome
by plaintiffs showing of a breach of loyalty.2" This is because a breach of
loyalty rebuts that element of the business judgment rule that presumes
"directors have acted in the best interests of the shareholders."
241
A shareholder should be free to make that showing other than in
instances concerning director conflict of interest or self-dealing. The duty
to advance corporate and shareholder interests is, after all, the affirmative
thrust of loyalty,24' and it exists as an additional obligation to the director
duty to act fairly when engaged in self-dealing. It should remain open to
a stockholder to prove that, in the totality of the circumstances,
disinterested director conduct was not a fulfilling of the loyalty "due" in
that situation. Successfully making that showing would either lead outright
to director liability for proven damages or, under the constraint of the Cede
framework, perhaps simply shift to defendant the burden to prove that its
conduct was "fair." This is not to say that courts in reviewing this issue
will, or should, lightly disregard board action. It only suggests that it
should remain open for a shareholder to prove that deference should not
automatically be given to the board action. The policy importance of
judicial deference remains intact, but it is not the only consideration, nor
is it conclusive where other factors outweigh it.
A measure of this substantive judicial safeguarding exists already,
although not under this rubric. The requirement that a business judgment
be substantively "rational" reflects judicial unwillingness to defer carte
blanche.243 This might be considered a way of inferring a bad faith
motive,2" or a substantive facet of care, but since that latter duty largely,
if not exclusively, is process-oriented, the rationality requirement is better
viewed as a way of assuring a modicum of affirmative loyalty."4 Once
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,933-34 (Del. 1993) (finding no business judgment rule review
"where the subject of the derivative suit is not a business decision of the board").
'See supra text accompanying notes 38, 43.
214Cede Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del. 1993).
2411d
u2See supra accompanying notes 80-90.
"3See supra notes 151, 230.
2 See supra notes 151,230.
U4'his is bolstered by the view that the obligation of good faith is itself an aspect of
loyalty. See Gaylord Container Sholders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475-76 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000).
Perhaps the element of good faith can supply a doctrinal vessel for at least capturing the more
affirmtive thrust of loyalty. See Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48-49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000);
supra notes 112, 151 & 230.
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some degree of substantive judicial review is permitted, the business
judgment rule is seen not to be an insurmountable procedural or substantive
barrier. The real question becomes why the standard is both set so low (no
"rational" basis) and across the board, rather than in a manner both more
open-textured and context-sensitive, as with the phrasing "due loyalty." In
effect, as a framework for guiding fiduciary review, the business judgment
rule becomes a rebuttable presumption that directors acted with due care
and due loyalty, a presumption plaintiff can substantively overcome on a
well-supported loyalty claim.2'
The notion of "due loyalty" honors the equitable nature of fiduciary
duties as well as the context-sensitive judicial task of determining breach
or fulfillment of such duties. The concept recognizes that there are strong
policy considerations against both damage awards and non-deferential
review standards while leaving open the possibility for a stockholder to
persuade a court that specified (non self-dealing) misconduct should be
treated as a loyalty breach. This upholds the traditional responsibility of
"the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of
the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity... distinguishe[s] it."
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Equity remains as "the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing
private claims." 24 ' Although the predictability and certainty that
accompany an approach confining loyalty to the minimum condition are
desirable, they are not the only legal virtues, and it will be impossible to
reduce equity--or an equitable notion like "due loyalty"--to a clear rule.
As Aristotle noted upon explicating the necessity for equity as an antidote
to the universality of legal rules: "[T]he rule of the undefined must be itself
undefined also."2 49 The judicial task here remains the vital one of fleshing
out what loyalty means-and how it differs from due care-through
frequent instances of saying whether particular conduct did or did not fulfill
that norm/duty.
This is not to say that filling out the duty of "due loyalty" should be
limited to judicial monitoring of director practices through shareholder
litigation of fiduciary concerns. Perhaps certain structural changes in
corporate governance will accompany the elaboration of due loyalty, as
2-See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 371.
2 4 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
7Mid at 329-30.
249ARISTOTLE, NICoMAcHEAN ETHIcs 142 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc.,1962 ) (n.d.).
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some have advocated for due care.25 ° Taking on fewer directorships may
permit more affirmative devotion to the interests of a specific corporation.
Declining directorships of companies that would detract from loyalty to a
particular corporation may be necessary to accord that corporation the
loyalty it is "due." Requiring significant stock ownership by directors may
serve salutary purposes with respect to fulfillment of the duty of loyalty as
well as the duty of care."'
Finally,just as care remains a legal duty notwithstanding thejudicial
deference housed in the business judgment rule,2" 2 affirmative loyalty to
corporate interests also is a legal duty, notwithstanding much judicial
emphasis on the minimal need only to refrain from disloyal conduct.
Therefore, lawyers counseling directors in the decision-making context can
(and should) emphasize the affirmative dimension of loyalty, stressing the
importance of identifying and then doing what is best for the enterprise, and
not simply advising directors to refrain from disloyal behavior. In post-
Enron boardrooms, legal counsel should advise directors that they have a
legal duty of loyalty that demands their considered judgment of what is best
for the corporation, not merely a duty to do what is acceptable or all right,
or, worse yet, a duty only to avoid certain conduct. To aid in this
professional discourse, corporate law professors also bear responsibility.
25 3
They should be careful not to truncate loyalty for law students by couching
discussion of it solely in terms of avoiding self-gain, thereby leading future
lawyers to internalize a professional norm "smaller" than the norm
prevailing outside legal discourse. 254 By hearing counsel explain how to be
authentically loyal and how to fulfill their duty of care, directors can bring
to these words their own recollection of teaching, stories, drama, poetry,
preaching, personal experience, and other sources where the exemplary
norm, of loyalty and care were modeled and transmitted. Such "legal"
advice serves to remind the hearer of a richer, moral-social meaning, which
can result in director action going beyond the liability-avoiding legal
minimum. By infusing the concepts of care and loyalty with social-moral-
experiential meaning, lay people may endow the concepts of care and
R. Franklin Balotti et al., Equity Ownership and the Duty of Care: Convergence,
Revolution, or Evolution? 55 Bus. LAW. 661 (2000).
21'Id. But cf Gene Koretz, Money Can't Buy A Loyal CEO, Bus. WK., Feb. 5, 2001, at
30 (reporting on study finding CEO compensation, including stock options, had no significant
effect on turnover, unless CEO had large stockholdings).
"2See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L REv. 437 (1993).
'See Lyman Johnson, The Social Responsibility of Corporate Law Professors, 76
TuLANE L. REV. 1483 (2002).
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loyalty with more significance than the legal minimum intended by
lawyers.2" The result is a much-needed upgrading of conduct beyond what
is required to avoid legal sanction.256
V. CONCLUSION
The notion of "due loyalty," as informed both by the lushness of
loyalty outside corporate law discourse and the unfortunate curbing of care
within that discourse, can help judges and other corporate law participants
come to grips with the key question of whether the demands of loyalty
should "expand to exact more than the negative act of nonbetrayal to
include affirmative attention and devotion."25 The common thread running
through the courtroom, boardroom and classroom settings is the apprecia-
tion that a moral vocabulary has been, and should remain, central to
corporate law discourse. This is the issue that lies at the heart of corporate
governance after Enron. The answer we give will shape the terms of
corporate discourse in the years ahead.
Breach of care as a discrete legal theory for obtaining money
damages may be gone, but the concept of care is too foundational to expel
altogether from corporate law, as the inescapable overlap of loyalty and
care reveals. From a legal sanctions standpoint, the duty of "loyalty"
remains robust. The historical, social-moral, and literary richness of that
term is capacious enough to encompass (and so preserve for corporate law)
a good portion of care. Yet, section 102(b)(7) and similar statutes
unmistakably sought to curb care claims. That effort could turn out to be
quite modest given that Delaware corporate law has aligned the fiduciary
duty of care with only one dimension of the multi-dimensional norm of
care. In short, care has been rendered a "small" notion in corporate law.
It largely refers to the manner in which directors are to act. It is a process-
oriented duty to act "with care." '58 Having confined care to that narrow
chamber, the other meanings of care as found in the phrases "take care of'
(the corporation) and "care for" (the corporation) remain fully available for
infusion into corporate law through an expansive duty of loyalty.
On the scholarship front, much of mainstream corporate law
scholarship over the last twenty-five years has been (or was thought to be)
5'See Lyman Johnson, Reclaimingan Ethic ofCorporate Responsibility, 70 Gso. WASH.
L. REV. 957 (2002).
"'LETCHER, supra note 51, at 40.
""See Johnson, supra note 5, at 810; Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000)
("Due care in the decisionmaldng context is process due care only.").
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anormative due to the pervasive influence of law and economics.
Corporate law scholarship, however, has recently rediscovered social
norms.259 Many disciplinary perspectives can enrich our understanding of
this relationship between social norms and (corporate) law.26 It would be
a mistake, however, in this renewed theoretical focus on the inter-
relationship between law and social norms to so decontextualize the inquiry
that we overlook the enormous potential of corporate law's already-existing
and overtly norm-laden vocabulary of"care" and "loyalty." These historic
legal notions are grounded in the larger social-moral norms whose very
inter-relationship with law is being examined in scholarship. These terms
provide a doctrinal entry point for scholarly insights and afford linguistic
access for the judiciary and bar to join scholars in the project of expressing
and reinforcing social norms through corporate law and practices. The
point here is that we stand at the beginning, not the end, of this important,
self-reflective episode in corporate law. After Enron, the duties and norms
of corporate law and corporate culture should be regrounded in widely
shared social norms. To do this, we must first reflect on and remember the
vitality and necessity of loyalty discourse in corporate law.
"See supra notes 7, 192.
'Robert Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1603, 1647 (2000). See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977)
(refering to "both the norm and the mandate" of corporate disclosure).
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